內(nèi)地與香港特別行政區(qū)發(fā)布相互執(zhí)行仲裁裁決的典型案例
來源：最高人民法院
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2020-11-27
《關(guān)于內(nèi)地與香港特別行政區(qū)相互執(zhí)行仲裁裁決的安排》生效施行20年以來，取得了豐碩的司法協(xié)助與合作成果。11月27日，在最高人民法院與香港特別行政區(qū)政府律政司簽署《關(guān)于內(nèi)地與香港特別行政區(qū)相互執(zhí)行仲裁裁決的補(bǔ)充安排》的同時(shí)，雙方以中英文雙語形式發(fā)布相互執(zhí)行仲裁裁決的10起典型案例。
此系兩地首次發(fā)布民商事司法協(xié)助典型案例，為進(jìn)一步完善兩地司法協(xié)助體系、回應(yīng)民眾司法需求探索出了行之有效的新舉措新路徑。典型案例的表述保持兩地各自語言習(xí)慣。
案例簡(jiǎn)介如下：
內(nèi)地人民法院案例目錄
一、華夏航運(yùn)（新加坡）有限公司申請(qǐng)執(zhí)行香港仲裁裁決案
二、美國(guó)意艾德建筑師事務(wù)所申請(qǐng)執(zhí)行香港仲裁裁決案
三、大衛(wèi)戴恩咨詢有限公司、布拉姆利有限公司申請(qǐng)執(zhí)行香港仲裁裁決案
四、萊佛士國(guó)際有限公司申請(qǐng)執(zhí)行香港仲裁裁決案
五、賓士奈設(shè)計(jì)集團(tuán)國(guó)際咨詢有限公司申請(qǐng)執(zhí)行香港仲裁裁決案
一、華夏航運(yùn)（新加坡）有限公司申請(qǐng)執(zhí)行香港仲裁裁決案
案號(hào)：（2018）粵72認(rèn)港1號(hào)、（2019）粵72認(rèn)港1號(hào)
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2012年2月1日，華夏航運(yùn)（新加坡）有限公司（以下簡(jiǎn)稱華夏公司）與東海運(yùn)輸有限公司（以下簡(jiǎn)稱東海公司）簽訂包運(yùn)合同，約定由東海公司運(yùn)載華夏公司貨物，因該包運(yùn)合同產(chǎn)生的所有爭(zhēng)議提交香港仲裁，適用英國(guó)法。同年4月21日，華夏公司向東海公司發(fā)送電子郵件，確認(rèn)雙方在前述包運(yùn)合同的基礎(chǔ)上達(dá)成補(bǔ)充合同，約定新增一批貨物運(yùn)輸，其他條款和條件適用包運(yùn)合同。后雙方就補(bǔ)充合同的履行發(fā)生爭(zhēng)議，華夏公司于2016年2月16日在香港提起仲裁。香港仲裁庭分別作出首次終局裁決和費(fèi)用終局裁決，裁決東海公司支付相應(yīng)賠償款項(xiàng)及相關(guān)仲裁費(fèi)用。
仲裁裁決生效后，華夏公司向廣州海事法院申請(qǐng)認(rèn)可和執(zhí)行上述兩份仲裁裁決。東海公司答辯認(rèn)為，華夏公司提交的仲裁協(xié)議未經(jīng)公證認(rèn)證，也未提交經(jīng)過正式證明的中文譯本；涉案貨物運(yùn)輸系補(bǔ)充合同約定內(nèi)容，補(bǔ)充合同是當(dāng)事人雙方通過電話形式口頭達(dá)成的，未約定仲裁條款或者仲裁協(xié)議，東海公司亦從未認(rèn)可仲裁庭具有管轄權(quán)；執(zhí)行仲裁裁決將違反內(nèi)地仲裁法關(guān)于仲裁協(xié)議必須明示的要求以及民法總則關(guān)于意思表示的有關(guān)規(guī)定，違反社會(huì)公共利益。
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廣州海事法院認(rèn)為，第一，華夏公司申請(qǐng)認(rèn)可和執(zhí)行仲裁裁決的文書符合《最高人民法院關(guān)于內(nèi)地與香港特別行政區(qū)相互執(zhí)行仲裁裁決的安排》（以下簡(jiǎn)稱《安排》）關(guān)于形式要件的要求。第二，仲裁協(xié)議成立與否屬于對(duì)仲裁協(xié)議效力的審查范圍，并且，因雙方當(dāng)事人未對(duì)確認(rèn)仲裁協(xié)議效力的準(zhǔn)據(jù)法作出約定，根據(jù)《安排》第七條第（一）項(xiàng)，應(yīng)依據(jù)仲裁地法律即香港法律對(duì)涉案仲裁協(xié)議是否成立進(jìn)行審查。而依據(jù)香港法律有關(guān)規(guī)定，涉案電子郵件記載的合同并入條款構(gòu)成有效成立的仲裁協(xié)議。第三，違反內(nèi)地法律有關(guān)規(guī)定，并不能等同于違反內(nèi)地社會(huì)公共利益，除非認(rèn)可和執(zhí)行仲裁裁決將造成嚴(yán)重?fù)p害內(nèi)地法律基本原則的后果。內(nèi)地仲裁法對(duì)仲裁協(xié)議的明示要求和民法總則對(duì)意思表示的要求，不屬于內(nèi)地法律的基本原則范圍?；谝陨侠碛?，裁定認(rèn)可和執(zhí)行涉案兩份仲裁裁決。另，根據(jù)華夏公司的申請(qǐng)，廣州海事法院于作出認(rèn)可和執(zhí)行仲裁裁決的裁定前，對(duì)東海公司在招商銀行深圳分行的存款予以凍結(jié)。
?。ㄈ┑湫鸵饬x
第一，明確仲裁協(xié)議成立與否屬于仲裁協(xié)議效力審查范圍。仲裁協(xié)議是當(dāng)事人申請(qǐng)認(rèn)可和執(zhí)行仲裁裁決時(shí)必須提交的文書，其直接關(guān)系到仲裁庭是否具有管轄權(quán)。對(duì)仲裁協(xié)議效力的審查，是認(rèn)可和執(zhí)行仲裁裁決需要解決的先決問題。為此，《安排》第七條第（一）項(xiàng)明確規(guī)定仲裁協(xié)議無效的，裁定不予執(zhí)行。但是，仲裁協(xié)議無效作廣義理解還是狹義理解，是否包括仲裁協(xié)議不成立的情形，在實(shí)踐中存在爭(zhēng)議。本案沒有局限于字面意思，而是從條文本意出發(fā)，認(rèn)為仲裁協(xié)議是否成立是仲裁協(xié)議是否有效的前提，屬于仲裁協(xié)議效力的審查范疇。仲裁協(xié)議無效應(yīng)包括仲裁協(xié)議不成立的情形。
第二，在作出認(rèn)可和執(zhí)行裁定前，依申請(qǐng)采取保全措施。法院在受理認(rèn)可和執(zhí)行仲裁裁決申請(qǐng)之前或者之后，可否對(duì)被申請(qǐng)人的財(cái)產(chǎn)采取保全措施，《安排》并未明確規(guī)定，實(shí)踐中理解也不一致。本案參照《關(guān)于內(nèi)地與澳門特別行政區(qū)相互認(rèn)可和執(zhí)行仲裁裁決的安排》，并根據(jù)《中華人民共和國(guó)民事訴訟法》及其司法解釋有關(guān)規(guī)定，依當(dāng)事人申請(qǐng)，分別在當(dāng)事人申請(qǐng)認(rèn)可和執(zhí)行仲裁裁決前，采取訴前保全措施；在當(dāng)事人申請(qǐng)認(rèn)可和執(zhí)行仲裁裁決后、法院作出認(rèn)可和執(zhí)行裁定之前，采取訴中保全措施。審理法院通過預(yù)防性救濟(jì)措施促進(jìn)裁決順利執(zhí)行，有利于保護(hù)當(dāng)事人合法權(quán)益。
二、美國(guó)意艾德建筑師事務(wù)所申請(qǐng)執(zhí)行香港仲裁裁決案
案號(hào)：（2016）蘇01認(rèn)港1號(hào)
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2013年3月29日、5月15日，美國(guó)意艾德建筑師事務(wù)所（以下簡(jiǎn)稱意艾德事務(wù)所）與富力南京地產(chǎn)開發(fā)有限公司（以下簡(jiǎn)稱富力公司）簽訂有關(guān)地塊設(shè)計(jì)合同，并約定了仲裁條款，將爭(zhēng)議提交中國(guó)國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易仲裁委員會(huì)，按照申請(qǐng)仲裁時(shí)該仲裁委員會(huì)現(xiàn)行有效的仲裁規(guī)則進(jìn)行仲裁，仲裁地點(diǎn)為香港特區(qū)。因合同履行發(fā)生爭(zhēng)議，2015年2月，意艾德事務(wù)所向中國(guó)國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易仲裁委員會(huì)香港仲裁中心（以下簡(jiǎn)稱貿(mào)仲香港中心）申請(qǐng)仲裁，請(qǐng)求裁決富力公司支付所欠設(shè)計(jì)費(fèi)并承擔(dān)違約責(zé)任等。
貿(mào)仲香港中心根據(jù)自2015年1月1日起施行的《中國(guó)國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易仲裁委員會(huì)仲裁規(guī)則》受理本案，并于2015年11月28日作出（2015）中國(guó)貿(mào)仲港裁字第0003號(hào)仲裁裁決。2016年6月7日，意艾德事務(wù)所向江蘇省南京市中級(jí)人民法院申請(qǐng)執(zhí)行該仲裁裁決第3項(xiàng)，即支付利息部分。富力公司未提出異議。
（二）裁判結(jié)果
江蘇省南京市中級(jí)人民法院經(jīng)審查認(rèn)為，富力公司對(duì)涉案仲裁裁決無異議，并已經(jīng)履行仲裁裁決所確定的設(shè)計(jì)費(fèi)本金部分，僅對(duì)第3項(xiàng)逾期利息部分未予支付。涉案仲裁裁決亦不存在違反內(nèi)地社會(huì)公共利益的情形。故依據(jù)《最高人民法院關(guān)于內(nèi)地與香港特別行政區(qū)相互執(zhí)行仲裁裁決的安排》（以下簡(jiǎn)稱《安排》）第一條、第七條的規(guī)定，裁定執(zhí)行該仲裁裁決第3 項(xiàng)。
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該案是內(nèi)地仲裁機(jī)構(gòu)在香港設(shè)立的分支機(jī)構(gòu)以香港為仲裁地作出的仲裁裁決獲得內(nèi)地法院執(zhí)行的首案，具有里程碑意義。該案明確，確認(rèn)仲裁裁決籍屬的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)為仲裁地，并據(jù)此認(rèn)定涉案仲裁裁決系香港仲裁裁決，符合《安排》的適用條件。
內(nèi)地法律對(duì)不同類型仲裁裁決規(guī)定了不同審查標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，且一般以仲裁機(jī)構(gòu)所在地確定仲裁裁決的籍屬。《最高人民法院關(guān)于香港仲裁裁決在內(nèi)地執(zhí)行的有關(guān)問題的通知》（以下簡(jiǎn)稱《通知》）規(guī)定，對(duì)于在香港作出的臨時(shí)仲裁裁決，以及國(guó)外仲裁機(jī)構(gòu)在香港作出的仲裁裁決，人民法院應(yīng)當(dāng)按照《安排》的規(guī)定進(jìn)行審查。這實(shí)際上明確了以仲裁地而非仲裁機(jī)構(gòu)所在地作為判斷仲裁裁決籍屬的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。但是，《通知》并未明確規(guī)定內(nèi)地仲裁機(jī)構(gòu)以香港為仲裁地作出的仲裁裁決是否屬于香港仲裁裁決的問題。本案依仲裁地認(rèn)定內(nèi)地仲裁機(jī)構(gòu)在香港設(shè)立的分支機(jī)構(gòu)作出仲裁裁決的籍屬，符合《通知》精神，也符合國(guó)際通行標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。
三、大衛(wèi)戴恩咨詢有限公司、布拉姆利有限公司申請(qǐng)執(zhí)行香港仲裁裁決案
案號(hào)：（2020）京04認(rèn)港5號(hào)
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大衛(wèi)戴恩咨詢有限公司（DAVID DEIN CONSULTANCY LIMITED）（以下簡(jiǎn)稱大衛(wèi)戴恩公司）、布拉姆利有限公司（BRAMLEY CORPORATION LTD）（以下簡(jiǎn)稱布拉姆利公司）分別與北京中赫國(guó)安足球俱樂部有限責(zé)任公司（以下簡(jiǎn)稱國(guó)安俱樂部）于2018年8月24日簽署了相同的《顧問協(xié)議》各一份，約定將爭(zhēng)議提交至香港國(guó)際仲裁中心以仲裁方式解決，準(zhǔn)據(jù)法為英格蘭法律。2018年11月21日，國(guó)安俱樂部據(jù)此向香港國(guó)際仲裁中心提交仲裁通知。后大衛(wèi)戴恩公司、布拉姆利公司提出反請(qǐng)求。香港國(guó)際仲裁中心就此于2020年3月5日作出了案號(hào)為HKIAC/A18211的裁決：國(guó)安俱樂部對(duì)《顧問協(xié)議》構(gòu)成了毀約性違約；國(guó)安俱樂部應(yīng)向大衛(wèi)戴恩公司、布拉姆利公司支付相關(guān)費(fèi)用及利息。
仲裁裁決生效后，大衛(wèi)戴恩公司、布拉姆利公司依據(jù)《最高人民法院關(guān)于內(nèi)地與香港特別行政區(qū)相互執(zhí)行仲裁裁決的安排》（以下簡(jiǎn)稱《安排》）向北京市第四中級(jí)人民法院申請(qǐng)認(rèn)可和執(zhí)行該仲裁裁決。被申請(qǐng)人國(guó)安俱樂部答辯稱，人民法院應(yīng)裁定不予認(rèn)可和執(zhí)行該仲裁裁決，并提出涉案仲裁協(xié)議無效、仲裁庭的組成與當(dāng)事人之間的協(xié)議以及香港特別行政區(qū)法律不符、仲裁庭程序與當(dāng)事人之間的協(xié)議不符、違反社會(huì)公共利益、金額不予認(rèn)可等理由。
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北京市第四中級(jí)人民法院經(jīng)審查認(rèn)為，第一，本案當(dāng)事人僅約定合同的準(zhǔn)據(jù)法為英格蘭實(shí)體法，未明確確認(rèn)涉外仲裁協(xié)議效力應(yīng)適用的法律，因仲裁機(jī)構(gòu)所在地和仲裁地均在香港，故應(yīng)適用香港《仲裁條例》進(jìn)行審查，依規(guī)定該協(xié)議有效。第二，依據(jù)仲裁時(shí)香港國(guó)際仲裁中心有效的2018年版港仲規(guī)則，仲裁庭的組成并不違反該規(guī)則。仲裁員與二公司的董事均在英國(guó)足協(xié)任職，并不必然表明仲裁員與二公司之間具有利益關(guān)系或者利害關(guān)系。仲裁庭的公開事項(xiàng)當(dāng)事人已知情，并不需要披露和認(rèn)定程序違法。第三，申請(qǐng)人提供的部分仲裁文書抄送、賬單費(fèi)用支出并不證明存在仲裁程序與協(xié)議不符，上述情況屬于在仲裁程序中公開事項(xiàng)，并不違反保密條款。第四，社會(huì)公共利益應(yīng)是關(guān)系到全體社會(huì)成員的利益，為社會(huì)公眾所享有，不同于合同當(dāng)事人的利益，雖然國(guó)安俱樂部的部分資產(chǎn)屬于國(guó)有資產(chǎn)，但不能將與其有關(guān)的所有事項(xiàng)均認(rèn)定為社會(huì)公共利益。故裁定認(rèn)可和執(zhí)行香港特別行政區(qū)香港國(guó)際仲裁中心HKIAC/AC18211號(hào)仲裁裁決。
?。ㄈ┑湫鸵饬x
1.本案明確了當(dāng)事人援引《安排》第七條中“仲裁庭的組成或者仲裁庭程序與當(dāng)事人之間的協(xié)議不符”條款，提出仲裁員存在披露、回避等程序問題時(shí)，法院應(yīng)依據(jù)仲裁規(guī)則，結(jié)合社會(huì)生活經(jīng)驗(yàn)合理判斷，以是否足以影響仲裁的公正性和獨(dú)立性為原則進(jìn)行審查。本案中，仲裁員因工作、生活、學(xué)習(xí)等社會(huì)活動(dòng)需要而與人接觸、交往，以及在同一組織任職等情況并不一定構(gòu)成回避規(guī)則中規(guī)定的利害關(guān)系或其他影響公正仲裁的關(guān)系，對(duì)于與仲裁員獨(dú)立性以及與公正仲裁無關(guān)的內(nèi)容，可以不予披露。
2.本案對(duì)社會(huì)公共利益進(jìn)行了闡釋，具有一定參考意義。社會(huì)公共利益應(yīng)是關(guān)系到全體社會(huì)成員的利益，為社會(huì)公眾所享有，為整個(gè)社會(huì)發(fā)展存在所需要，具有公共性和社會(huì)性，不同于合同當(dāng)事人的利益。涉案仲裁處理的爭(zhēng)議為平等民事主體間的合同爭(zhēng)議，處理結(jié)果僅影響合同當(dāng)事人，不涉及社會(huì)公共利益。雖然本案被申請(qǐng)人國(guó)安俱樂部的部分資產(chǎn)屬于國(guó)有資產(chǎn)，但不能將與其有關(guān)的所有事項(xiàng)均認(rèn)定為社會(huì)公共利益。
四、萊佛士國(guó)際有限公司申請(qǐng)執(zhí)行香港仲裁裁決案
案號(hào)：（2016）津01認(rèn)港1號(hào)
?。ㄒ唬┗景盖?/p>
2007年1月15日，萊佛士國(guó)際有限公司（以下簡(jiǎn)稱萊佛士公司）與海航天津中心發(fā)展有限公司（以下簡(jiǎn)稱海航公司）就“萊佛士”標(biāo)志和商標(biāo)使用事宜達(dá)成《許可合同》。同日，萊佛士酒店管理（北京）有限公司（系萊佛士公司的關(guān)聯(lián)公司，以下簡(jiǎn)稱萊佛士北京）與海航公司就酒店管理運(yùn)營(yíng)合作事宜簽訂《酒店管理合同》。《許可合同》約定由該合同產(chǎn)生的或與該合同有關(guān)的任何爭(zhēng)議、爭(zhēng)論或糾紛應(yīng)提交香港國(guó)際仲裁中心根據(jù)申請(qǐng)仲裁時(shí)仲裁庭當(dāng)時(shí)有效的仲裁規(guī)則最終仲裁解決，仲裁地點(diǎn)為香港，同時(shí)約定，如果《酒店管理合同》或任何其他交易合同因任何原因終止，該合同立即終止?！毒频旯芾砗贤芳s定有關(guān)爭(zhēng)議提交中國(guó)國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易仲裁委員會(huì)上海分會(huì)（以下簡(jiǎn)稱上海貿(mào)仲）裁決。
2012年1月20日，萊佛士公司向香港國(guó)際仲裁中心申請(qǐng)就《許可合同》所涉爭(zhēng)議進(jìn)行仲裁。2012年1月29日，萊佛士北京向上海貿(mào)仲申請(qǐng)就《酒店管理合同》所涉爭(zhēng)議進(jìn)行仲裁。此后，香港國(guó)際仲裁中心作出仲裁裁決（案件編號(hào)HKIAC/A12016），裁決海航公司向萊佛士公司支付相應(yīng)款項(xiàng)及利息。萊佛士公司向天津市第一中級(jí)人民法院申請(qǐng)執(zhí)行仲裁裁決。被申請(qǐng)人海航公司以裁決所處理的爭(zhēng)議不在仲裁協(xié)議條款之內(nèi)等理由認(rèn)為其違反《最高人民法院關(guān)于內(nèi)地與香港特別行政區(qū)相互執(zhí)行仲裁裁決的安排》（以下簡(jiǎn)稱《安排》第七條的規(guī)定，應(yīng)不予執(zhí)行。
?。ǘ┎门薪Y(jié)果
天津市第一中級(jí)人民法院經(jīng)層報(bào)天津市高級(jí)人民法院、最高人民法院審查認(rèn)為：第一，香港國(guó)際仲裁中心的裁決涉及《酒店管理合同》的情形不構(gòu)成超裁，不屬于《安排》第七條第一款第（三）項(xiàng)的情形。第二，仲裁庭對(duì)管轄問題的處理并未違反當(dāng)事人的協(xié)議及香港特別行政區(qū)法律，不屬于《安排》第七條第一款第（四）項(xiàng)的情形。第三，海航公司所提出的質(zhì)疑，不屬于對(duì)仲裁員公正性或獨(dú)立性的質(zhì)疑，而是對(duì)管轄權(quán)的質(zhì)疑，仲裁庭有權(quán)予以決定，無需由仲裁中心理事會(huì)決定，故不屬于《仲裁裁決執(zhí)行安排》第七條第一款第（四）項(xiàng)的情形。綜上，天津市第一中級(jí)人民法院依照《安排》第一條、第六條、第七條之規(guī)定，裁定執(zhí)行香港國(guó)際仲裁中心于2014年11月19日、2015年3月19日作出的編號(hào)為HKIAC/A12016的部分裁決和終局裁決。
?。ㄈ┑湫鸵饬x
本案在仲裁裁決是否屬于《安排》第七條第一款第（三）項(xiàng)所規(guī)定的“超裁”情形方面，明確了以下規(guī)則：仲裁庭僅在裁決理由的事實(shí)認(rèn)定和說理部分對(duì)非屬其管轄的爭(zhēng)議進(jìn)行評(píng)判，并未在裁決主文中涉及其他合同爭(zhēng)議的，不構(gòu)成“超裁”。
本案中，萊佛士公司提請(qǐng)香港國(guó)際仲裁中心仲裁的事項(xiàng)是有關(guān)《許可合同》履行的相關(guān)爭(zhēng)議。因《許可合同》和《酒店管理合同》關(guān)系密切，故仲裁裁決在查明事實(shí)和說理部分涉及了《酒店管理合同》的有關(guān)情況。該分析認(rèn)定是仲裁庭審理《許可合同》糾紛所無法避免的。仲裁庭最終僅圍繞仲裁請(qǐng)求就《許可合同》所涉爭(zhēng)議作出了相應(yīng)的裁決結(jié)果，并未對(duì)《酒店管理合同》所涉爭(zhēng)議作出具體的裁決項(xiàng)。有關(guān)爭(zhēng)議屬于當(dāng)事人在仲裁協(xié)議中約定交付仲裁的范圍，涉案仲裁裁決不存在《安排》第七條第一款第（三）項(xiàng)所規(guī)定的“超裁”情形。
五、賓士奈設(shè)計(jì)集團(tuán)國(guó)際咨詢有限公司申請(qǐng)執(zhí)行香港仲裁裁決案
案號(hào)：（2019）川01認(rèn)港1號(hào)
?。ㄒ唬┗景盖?/p>
2013年11月13日，賓士奈設(shè)計(jì)集團(tuán)國(guó)際咨詢有限公司（以下簡(jiǎn)稱賓士奈公司）與成都門里望江置地有限公司（以下簡(jiǎn)稱門里公司）、成都晨川實(shí)業(yè)有限公司（以下簡(jiǎn)稱晨川公司）簽訂《中國(guó)成都文華東方酒店景觀設(shè)計(jì)服務(wù)協(xié)議》（以下簡(jiǎn)稱《服務(wù)協(xié)議》）?！斗?wù)協(xié)議》約定，由本合同或本合同違約、終止或無效引起的或與之相關(guān)的任何爭(zhēng)議、爭(zhēng)論或權(quán)利主張應(yīng)根據(jù)屆時(shí)有效的《聯(lián)合國(guó)國(guó)際貿(mào)易法委員會(huì)仲裁規(guī)則》（以下簡(jiǎn)稱《仲裁規(guī)則》）在香港通過仲裁解決。因合同履行過程中發(fā)生爭(zhēng)議，2018年3月5日，賓士奈公司向香港國(guó)際仲裁中心申請(qǐng)仲裁。2019年5月5日，仲裁庭作出《最終裁決》，支持了賓士奈公司所有仲裁請(qǐng)求。2019年6月4日，仲裁庭作出《最終裁決之更正》，對(duì)《最終裁決》進(jìn)行了更正和更新。后賓士奈公司向四川省成都市中級(jí)人民法院申請(qǐng)執(zhí)行上述仲裁裁決。
門里公司、晨川公司共同答辯認(rèn)為：第一，仲裁員的選任未依據(jù)《仲裁規(guī)則》第8條的規(guī)定采取名單法先行征求各方當(dāng)事人意見，而是徑行指定獨(dú)任仲裁員，屬于《最高人民法院關(guān)于內(nèi)地與香港特別行政區(qū)相互執(zhí)行仲裁裁決的安排》（以下簡(jiǎn)稱《安排》）第七條第（四）項(xiàng)規(guī)定情形。第二，仲裁員未按司法部令第69號(hào)《中國(guó)委托公證人（香港）管理辦法》規(guī)定向被申請(qǐng)人送達(dá)相關(guān)仲裁文書，屬于《安排》第七條第（二）項(xiàng)規(guī)定情形。故請(qǐng)求駁回申請(qǐng)。
?。ǘ┎门薪Y(jié)果
四川省成都市中級(jí)人民法院經(jīng)審查認(rèn)為，第一，關(guān)于涉案仲裁庭的組成。雙方在《服務(wù)協(xié)議》中約定適用《仲裁規(guī)則》。案涉仲裁程序中，香港國(guó)際仲裁中心行使裁量權(quán)指定獨(dú)任仲裁員符合以上規(guī)定。第二，關(guān)于仲裁庭是否以適當(dāng)方式向被申請(qǐng)人送達(dá)。涉案仲裁程序中仲裁員按照雙方《服務(wù)協(xié)議》約定的地址送達(dá)相關(guān)文書，且被申請(qǐng)人也表明確實(shí)收到，符合《仲裁規(guī)則》第二條關(guān)于送達(dá)的規(guī)定，不存在仲裁員未適當(dāng)通知被申請(qǐng)人的問題。被申請(qǐng)人主張應(yīng)按《中國(guó)委托公證人（香港）管理辦法》規(guī)定向被申請(qǐng)人送達(dá)相關(guān)仲裁文書，與《仲裁規(guī)則》規(guī)定不符，對(duì)該意見不予采納。
?。ㄈ┑湫鸵饬x
本案明確，判斷送達(dá)是否成功的依據(jù)應(yīng)當(dāng)是仲裁程序適用的仲裁規(guī)則?！拔唇?jīng)依法送達(dá)”，是被申請(qǐng)人較常提出的不予執(zhí)行香港仲裁裁決的理由。判斷是否依法有效送達(dá)，首先應(yīng)當(dāng)明確送達(dá)程序所依據(jù)的規(guī)定。本案中，雙方在合同中約定，由本合同或本合同違約、終止或無效引起的或與之相關(guān)的任何爭(zhēng)議、爭(zhēng)論或權(quán)利主張應(yīng)根據(jù)屆時(shí)有效的《仲裁規(guī)則》解決。據(jù)此，本案充分尊重當(dāng)事人的選擇，依據(jù)《仲裁規(guī)則》有關(guān)規(guī)定，并按照雙方《服務(wù)協(xié)議》約定的地址送達(dá)相關(guān)文書，且被申請(qǐng)人也表明確實(shí)收到，不存在仲裁員未適當(dāng)通知被申請(qǐng)人的問題。被申請(qǐng)人主張應(yīng)按《中國(guó)委托公證人（香港）管理辦法》規(guī)定向被申請(qǐng)人送達(dá)相關(guān)仲裁文書，與《仲裁規(guī)則》規(guī)定不符。
香港特別行政區(qū)法院案例目錄
一、CL 訴 SCG案
二、高海燕訴建毅控股有限公司及其他案
三、廈門新景地集團(tuán)有限公司訴裕景興業(yè)有限公司案
四、山東紅日阿康化工股份有限公司訴中國(guó)石油國(guó)際事業(yè)（香港）有限公司案
五、郭順開訴永成化工有限公司案
一、CL 訴 SCG案
[2019] 2 HKLRD 144
HCCT 9/2018
I. 基本案情
這是答辯人提出的作為一個(gè)初步問題的聆訊。聆訊涉及的問題是關(guān)于針對(duì)答辯人強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行仲裁裁決的申請(qǐng)是否受到香港法例第347章《時(shí)效條例》（“《時(shí)效條例》”）第4（1）（c）條的限制而喪失時(shí)效。
申請(qǐng)人與答辯人進(jìn)行香港某仲裁中心管理之仲裁，申請(qǐng)人獲勝訴，裁決命令答辯人需立即向申請(qǐng)人支付美金 2,173,000 元、利息及因仲裁而產(chǎn)生之費(fèi)用。
2011年3月，申請(qǐng)人向答辯人先后就仲裁裁決確定所需付的款項(xiàng)及仲裁所產(chǎn)生之費(fèi)用作出追討，但并不成功。申請(qǐng)人遂于2011年7月7日向內(nèi)地某人民法院申請(qǐng)強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行該仲裁裁決，但被該法院駁回。申請(qǐng)人隨后向上一級(jí)人民法院上訴及作出從審申請(qǐng)，2016年3月1日被駁回。
2018年2月6日，申請(qǐng)人根據(jù)香港法例第341章《仲裁條例》(已廢除) （“《仲裁條例》”）第2GG條單方面向香港法庭提交有關(guān)強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行該仲裁裁決的許可申請(qǐng)并成功取得該許可及有關(guān)之法庭命令（“命令”）。在2018年6月6日，答辯人申請(qǐng)雙方面聆訊以擱置仲裁裁決，并以多項(xiàng)理據(jù)支持其申請(qǐng)。所提出的理據(jù)包括在《時(shí)效條例》第4（1）（c）條下，申請(qǐng)人就強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行仲裁裁決的申請(qǐng)已喪失時(shí)效。在2018年7月24日，法庭命令審訊有關(guān)喪失時(shí)效的初步爭(zhēng)議。
?、?爭(zhēng)議
1.有關(guān)強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行仲裁裁決的訴訟因由從何時(shí)累算？（“爭(zhēng)議1”）
2.鑒于《關(guān)于內(nèi)地與香港特別行政區(qū)相互執(zhí)行仲裁裁決的安排》（“《安排》”）的第二條，從申請(qǐng)人于2011年7月7日向內(nèi)地某人民法院申請(qǐng)強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行仲裁裁決至2016年3月1日上一級(jí)人民法院駁回其強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行仲裁裁決的申請(qǐng)期間，訴訟因由及《時(shí)效條例》第4（1）（c）條下的時(shí)效作用是否暫停? (“爭(zhēng)議2”)
Ⅲ.分析
爭(zhēng)議1
答辯人認(rèn)為，時(shí)效期限是由仲裁裁決頒發(fā)之日起3個(gè)月，即2011年5月17日開始。此日期被辯稱為答辯人支付和履行裁決的合理時(shí)間，這意味著時(shí)效期限應(yīng)于2017年5月18日到期。另外，答辯人辯稱訴訟因由的替代開始累算時(shí)間最遲為2011年7月8日，即申請(qǐng)人向內(nèi)地某人民法院申請(qǐng)強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行該裁決之日。從此日推算出來的時(shí)效期限于2017年7月9日結(jié)束。
另一方面，申請(qǐng)人認(rèn)為，時(shí)效期限僅始于答辯人提交陳詞反對(duì)申請(qǐng)人在內(nèi)地某人民法院提出的申請(qǐng)的日期，即2012年3月11日。申請(qǐng)人辯稱，盡管答辯人未有按申請(qǐng)人在2011年3月向答辯人提出付款的要求付款，從這行為的基礎(chǔ)上無法推論出答辯人是否就仲裁裁決提出爭(zhēng)議。申請(qǐng)人表示，答辯人僅在提出前述反對(duì)陳詞時(shí)展示了其清楚明確不受裁決約束的意圖。因此，申請(qǐng)人認(rèn)為，訴訟因由在2012年3月11日才開始累算。
鑒于法庭在International Bulk Shipping and Services Ltd 訴Minerals and Metals Trading Corp of India [1996] 1 All ER 1017一案里拒絕接受類近于前述有關(guān)訴訟因由的累算和意圖的論點(diǎn)，法庭不接受訴訟因由僅在一方展示了其清楚明確不受裁決約束的意圖才開始累算。法庭解釋，接受這論點(diǎn)意味著允許仲裁裁決債務(wù)人可以無限期延遲和押后裁決債權(quán)人因訴訟因由而產(chǎn)生的累算，從而拖延其強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行裁決下的權(quán)利。隨法庭在International Bulk Shipping and Services Ltd 訴Minerals and Metals Trading Corp of India [1996] 1 All ER 1017一案及Agromet Motoimport Ltd 訴Moulden Engineering Ltd[1985] 1 WLR 762一案里的判決，法庭認(rèn)為當(dāng)“答辯人未能在被追討時(shí)履行仲裁裁決中的承諾”，訴訟因由就開始累算。因此，時(shí)效期限在履行裁決的隱含承諾被違反時(shí)開始。
法庭進(jìn)一步指出，當(dāng)答辯人在公布仲裁裁決及展開追討后的合理時(shí)間內(nèi)未能付款時(shí)，訴訟因由便產(chǎn)生。何為“合理的時(shí)間”則取決于裁決的條款及案情。在本案中，由于答辯人被命令“立即”向申請(qǐng)人支付仲裁裁決下的款項(xiàng)，本案的最遲合理付款時(shí)間為2011年4月8日，即申請(qǐng)人要求付款后的21天。因此，時(shí)效期限于2017年4月8日結(jié)束。
爭(zhēng)議2
申請(qǐng)人辯稱，其訴訟因由累算在2011年7月7日至2016年3月1日期間暫停，即申請(qǐng)人向內(nèi)地某人民法院申請(qǐng)強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行仲裁裁決的日期至該申請(qǐng)最終被上一級(jí)人民法院駁回之日。申請(qǐng)人提及《安排》的第2條和仲裁條例的40C條，該條例禁止在內(nèi)地和香港同時(shí)提出強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行仲裁裁決的申請(qǐng)，并指出該限制的目標(biāo)是堵塞雙重強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行和雙重追討的漏洞(Shenzhen Kai Loong Investment and Development Co Ltd 訴CEC Electrical Manufacturing (International) Co. Ltd [2001-2003] HKCLRT 649)。因此，申請(qǐng)人認(rèn)為法庭不應(yīng)僅因?yàn)槠湓噲D在內(nèi)地申請(qǐng)強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行仲裁裁決，在《時(shí)效條例》第4（1）（c）條下被禁止在香港申請(qǐng)強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行該裁決。
可是，法庭認(rèn)為，縱使“不能同時(shí)執(zhí)行規(guī)則”可能造成不公平的后果，在《安排》或《仲裁條例》均沒有明文規(guī)定的情況下，即使在內(nèi)地的強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行申請(qǐng)程序在進(jìn)行中,《時(shí)效條例》第4（1）（c）條下的時(shí)效累算不應(yīng)暫停。因此，法庭拒絕接受申請(qǐng)人有關(guān)訴訟因由的累算應(yīng)該在內(nèi)地的強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行申請(qǐng)程序的進(jìn)行期間暫停的論點(diǎn)。
鑒基于上述有關(guān)爭(zhēng)議1和爭(zhēng)議2的分析，法庭認(rèn)為，在《時(shí)效條例》第4（1）（c）條下，于2018年2月6日在香港提起的強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行仲裁裁決許可的申請(qǐng)程序應(yīng)該被禁止。
Ⅳ.裁決
答辯人的撤銷命令的申請(qǐng)予以允許。
Ⅴ.典型意義
?。╝）訴訟時(shí)效于違反履行仲裁裁決的隱含承諾的那日開始。此日為裁決債務(wù)人未能于頒下裁決及被追討后的合理時(shí)限內(nèi)履行裁決。裁決中合理的付款和履行時(shí)間取決于裁決的條款以及案件的事實(shí)和情況。
?。╞）此案顯示，縱使《安排》的第二條規(guī)定仲裁裁決債權(quán)人必須在一地法院獲得的償還不足夠的情況下，才能于另一地法院就不足部分尋求強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行仲裁裁決，《時(shí)效條例》的時(shí)效會(huì)在仲裁裁決債權(quán)人在另一地尋求強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行裁決期間繼續(xù)累算。這所可能導(dǎo)致的不公平情況，例如本案申請(qǐng)人所面對(duì)的困苦，突出了原《安排》的缺陷及針對(duì)其第二條禁止于兩地同時(shí)進(jìn)行強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行仲裁裁決的改革的必要性。
二、高海燕訴建毅控股有限公司及其他案
[2012] 1 HKLRD 627
CACV 79/2011
I.基本案情
申請(qǐng)人通過股份轉(zhuǎn)讓協(xié)議及補(bǔ)充股份轉(zhuǎn)讓協(xié)議（“該協(xié)議”），將一家香港公司的股份轉(zhuǎn)讓給答辯人。該香港公司在一家位于中國(guó)內(nèi)地的合資企業(yè)煤生意中擁有實(shí)質(zhì)權(quán)益。該協(xié)議受中國(guó)內(nèi)地法律管轄并規(guī)定在內(nèi)地某仲裁委進(jìn)行仲裁。
根據(jù)該仲裁委《仲裁規(guī)則》第37條，調(diào)解-仲裁應(yīng)由仲裁庭或首席仲裁員進(jìn)行，或在仲裁雙方同意下，由任何第三方進(jìn)行。仲裁庭進(jìn)行了兩次會(huì)議。第一次聆訊后，仲裁庭主動(dòng)向仲裁雙方建議，由答辯人向申請(qǐng)人支付人民幣2.5億元以解決此案。
在第二次聆訊前，在答辯人委任的仲裁員和首席仲裁員都不在場(chǎng)的情況下，申請(qǐng)人委任的仲裁員及答辯人的關(guān)系人在該仲裁委秘書長(zhǎng)的邀請(qǐng)下出席了非正式會(huì)議，該會(huì)議被聲稱為調(diào)解仲裁的會(huì)議。該仲裁委秘書長(zhǎng)不是由雙方協(xié)議任命的。據(jù)稱，他是主持非正式會(huì)議的人，并要求答辯人的關(guān)系人說服答辯人接受仲裁庭的建議。
仲裁雙方最終未能達(dá)成和解。仲裁庭頒下了對(duì)申請(qǐng)人有利的裁決。該裁決建議（但并不是要求）賠償額人民幣5,000萬元。答辯人從來沒有就仲裁庭的舉止投訴過，因?yàn)閾?dān)心這樣做會(huì)與仲裁庭產(chǎn)生對(duì)抗。答辯人遂向該仲裁委所在地中級(jí)人民法院提出訴訟，并指稱該仲裁委秘書長(zhǎng)操縱了仲裁結(jié)果，因而違反了法律和仲裁規(guī)則。結(jié)果，被駁回。
后來，申請(qǐng)人根據(jù)香港法例第341章《仲裁條例》（已廢除）第2GG條和第40B條，獲得許可在香港強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行仲裁裁決。答辯人在申請(qǐng)擱置該許可時(shí)辯稱，由于裁決受到偏頗或表面偏頗的影響，強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行裁決會(huì)與公共政策相抵觸。答辯人辯稱，申請(qǐng)人委任的仲裁員 、仲裁委秘書長(zhǎng)和答辯人的關(guān)系人企圖透過他們之間晚飯期間舉行的一次非正式會(huì)議向答辯人施加壓力，使答辯人向申請(qǐng)人支付人民幣2.5億元，以換取一個(gè)對(duì)答辯人有利的裁決。原訟庭法官裁定該仲裁裁決受到表面偏頗的影響。該法官亦裁定，答辯人在所謂的非正式會(huì)議事件后繼續(xù)進(jìn)行第二次聆訊并不代表放棄了對(duì)偏頗提出申訴的權(quán)利。申請(qǐng)人遂提出上訴。
?、?爭(zhēng)議
1.適用于強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行公約仲裁裁決的公共政策理據(jù)是否適用于內(nèi)地仲裁裁決？有關(guān)門檻有多高？（“爭(zhēng)議1”）
2.答辯人是否放棄了就違反仲裁委規(guī)則的情況進(jìn)行申訴的權(quán)利？（“爭(zhēng)議2”）
3.表面偏頗（相對(duì)于實(shí)際偏頗）是否足以構(gòu)成拒絕強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行仲裁裁決的公共政策理據(jù)？（“爭(zhēng)議3”）
4.基于案件的事實(shí)情況，所指稱的表面偏頗是否構(gòu)成拒絕強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行仲裁裁決的公共政策理據(jù)？（“爭(zhēng)議4”）
Ⅲ.分析
爭(zhēng)議1
法庭裁定，基于公共政策理據(jù)拒絕強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行公約仲裁裁決的法律哲學(xué)亦適用于內(nèi)地仲裁裁決。相關(guān)的門檻很高，理由是國(guó)際禮節(jié)原則必須被“編織”到公共政策的概念中，亦因此必須在涉及外地（包括內(nèi)地）的仲裁裁決的情況下予以實(shí)施。在這一點(diǎn)上，法庭援引了Hebei Import & Export Corp訴Polytek Engineering Co Ltd（1999）2 HKCFAR 111一案的判詞。法庭在該案指出，為使國(guó)際禮節(jié)原則予以實(shí)施，除非強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行外地仲裁裁決會(huì)與香港的道德和公正的基本概念相抵觸，否則法庭不會(huì)拒絕強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行；而得出這結(jié)論需要非常充分的理由。
爭(zhēng)議2
法庭裁定如果仲裁一方希望以違反仲裁規(guī)則的情況作為依據(jù)，其應(yīng)即時(shí)提出相關(guān)依據(jù)；不應(yīng)等待并得悉其申索的結(jié)果為如何后，才決定作出申訴；亦不應(yīng)猶如沒有違規(guī)情況般讓仲裁繼續(xù)進(jìn)行。因此，答辯人不應(yīng)在非正式會(huì)議事件后僅向法庭提交補(bǔ)充意見，亦不應(yīng)在沒有作出申訴的情況下出席第二次仲裁聆訊。法庭還指出，答辯人對(duì)申請(qǐng)人的誠(chéng)信作出的攻擊并不能替代對(duì)仲裁庭或仲裁委秘書長(zhǎng)有關(guān)其任何偏頗或不當(dāng)行為所作出的申訴。基于上述原因，答辯人在法律上被視為放棄了就偏頗情況進(jìn)行申訴。
法庭解釋，如果當(dāng)初作出了有關(guān)申訴，仲裁庭或仲裁委所在地人民法院可能已經(jīng)采取了補(bǔ)救措施；而兩者都更有能力就案件的事實(shí)裁定偏頗是否存在。法庭認(rèn)為，盡管仲裁委所在地人民法院拒絕以偏頗為由擱置仲裁裁決的決定對(duì)香港法庭沒有約束力，亦即使不容反悔原則并沒有因?yàn)榍笆龇ㄔ旱臎Q定而在本案適用，香港法庭有權(quán)在決定是否強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行仲裁裁決時(shí)，慎重考慮仲裁委所在地人民法院的決定。
爭(zhēng)議3
經(jīng)對(duì)Hebei Import & Export Corp訴Polytek Engineering Co Ltd一案中所表達(dá)的觀點(diǎn)進(jìn)行仔細(xì)詮釋后，法庭認(rèn)為法庭可以僅因?yàn)楸砻嫫H而拒絕強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行仲裁裁決。可是，如果仲裁一方希望以表面偏頗作為依據(jù)，它要達(dá)到的門檻比以實(shí)際偏頗作為依據(jù)時(shí)所適用的門檻高，而法庭在行使有關(guān)的酌情權(quán)應(yīng)該審慎。
爭(zhēng)議4
法庭按其對(duì)相關(guān)事實(shí)的評(píng)估，認(rèn)為不存在“客觀持平的觀察者”恐怕表面偏頗的情況。法院裁定，雖然一般人可能會(huì)與原訟庭法官一樣對(duì)調(diào)解進(jìn)行的方式感到不安，因?yàn)橄愀鄣恼{(diào)解通常以不同的方式進(jìn)行，但是否會(huì)引起表面的偏見可能取決于對(duì)調(diào)解地點(diǎn)通常如何進(jìn)行調(diào)解的理解。有關(guān)這方面，法庭表示必須充分考慮仲裁委所在地人民法院拒絕擱置仲裁裁決的決定。
法庭重申，法庭只會(huì)在強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行仲裁裁決會(huì)與執(zhí)行地（在本案里為香港）的道德和公正的基本概念相抵觸的情況下拒絕強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行裁決。因此，法庭不應(yīng)僅因?yàn)榉钦綍?huì)議的形式在香港可能會(huì)引起看似表面偏頗而拒絕在香港強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行該仲裁裁決。
?、?裁決
上訴得直。
?、?典型意義
如果仲裁一方希望以違反仲裁規(guī)則的情況作為依據(jù)，其應(yīng)即時(shí)提出相關(guān)依據(jù)；不應(yīng)等待并得悉其申索的結(jié)果為如何后，才決定作出申訴；亦不應(yīng)猶如沒有違規(guī)情況般讓仲裁繼續(xù)進(jìn)行。
法庭只會(huì)在強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行仲裁裁決會(huì)與執(zhí)行地的道德和公正的基本概念相抵觸的情況下拒絕強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行裁決。法庭尊重在進(jìn)行調(diào)解地慣常的調(diào)解形式，不會(huì)僅因形式和本地不一樣而輕易引用違反公共政策。
三、廈門新景地集團(tuán)有限公司訴裕景興業(yè)有限公司案
[2009] 4 HKLRD 353;
CACV 106/2008 & CACV 197/2008
?、?基本案情
第一和第二上訴人是兩家香港公司，亦是利景興業(yè)(香港)有限公司（“香港利景”）的唯一股東，同時(shí)是裕景集團(tuán)的成員之一。香港利景全資擁有一家內(nèi)地公司，該公司在廈門擁有一塊土地（“該物業(yè)”）。
申請(qǐng)人（一家內(nèi)地公司）同意向上訴人支付1.2億元人民幣，以獲取開發(fā)、經(jīng)營(yíng)該物業(yè)的權(quán)利并從中獲得利潤(rùn)。上訴人亦同意將其在香港利景中的股份轉(zhuǎn)讓給申請(qǐng)人，并將該物業(yè)交付給申請(qǐng)人（“該協(xié)議”）。該協(xié)議包含一項(xiàng)仲裁條款。
上訴人沒有將該物業(yè)交付給申請(qǐng)人，并以履行該協(xié)議違反中國(guó)內(nèi)地法律為由宣稱終止該協(xié)議。因此，申請(qǐng)人于北京展開仲裁程序（ “第一次仲裁”），并獲得了對(duì)其有利的裁決（“該裁決”），當(dāng)中命令上訴人要繼續(xù)履行該協(xié)議。申請(qǐng)人隨后在香港單方面獲得了強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行該裁決的命令（“ 該命令”）。
上訴人申請(qǐng)了擱置該命令，認(rèn)為根據(jù)香港法例第341章《仲裁條例》（“《仲裁條例》》”），強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行該命令應(yīng)該因?yàn)闊o法履行該協(xié)議致使強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行該命令會(huì)與公共政策相抵觸為理由被拒絕，其中原因包括：（a）有關(guān)該物業(yè)的施工已經(jīng)展開；（b）裕景集團(tuán)的重組已于第一次仲裁期間落實(shí)，而香港利景股份已在過程中被攤薄，當(dāng)中部份已被轉(zhuǎn)讓了給其母公司。法官拒絕擱置該命令。
同時(shí)，上訴人向仲裁委尋求就該協(xié)議雙方在協(xié)議下的責(zé)任是否已被解除的問題做出裁定（“第二次仲裁”）。仲裁委裁定上訴人敗訴。
在本次聆訊以處理上訴人提出的有關(guān)法官拒絕擱置該命令的上訴之時(shí)，該物業(yè)的開發(fā)已經(jīng)完成，而當(dāng)中99％ 落成的單位亦已出售給第三方。上訴人認(rèn)為，由于無法履行該協(xié)議，因此申請(qǐng)人實(shí)際上是申請(qǐng)“更進(jìn)一步”的補(bǔ)救措施，例如損害賠償或交出所得利潤(rùn)，而不是有關(guān)該物業(yè)本身的任何權(quán)益。上訴人亦承諾他們將展開下一輪的仲裁委仲裁，讓仲裁庭決定采取什么替代補(bǔ)救措施（“該承諾”）。此外，上訴人提出法庭亦可以將此案發(fā)還仲裁委，以便得到其指示，或?qū)⑸显V押后至仲裁委頒下其指示后。
?、?爭(zhēng)議
1.上訴人是否無法履行該協(xié)議？（“爭(zhēng)議1”）
2.鑒于爭(zhēng)議1，是否有充分理由按公共政策理據(jù)拒絕強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行該裁決？（“爭(zhēng)議2”）
3.法庭是否有司法管轄權(quán)把案件發(fā)還仲裁委？（“爭(zhēng)議3”）
?、?分析
爭(zhēng)議1
法庭指出，上訴人有充分機(jī)會(huì)向仲裁委直接提出無法履行該協(xié)議的問題，但上訴人并沒有這樣做。因此，法庭認(rèn)為該承諾毫無意義。由于有關(guān)的做法沒有合理解釋，法庭因此認(rèn)為此做法很明顯是上訴人刻意的決定。法庭拒絕接受上訴人以下論點(diǎn)：即該物業(yè)的施工已經(jīng)展開；因裕景集團(tuán)的重組導(dǎo)致香港利景股份在過程中被攤薄；以及大部分該物業(yè)的單位亦已出售給第三方，致使其無法履行該協(xié)議。法庭認(rèn)為這都是上訴人計(jì)算過的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，并且是其一手造成的，因此上訴人須承擔(dān)后果。法庭亦指出，由于該命令沒有規(guī)定任何強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行時(shí)間，而且真正無法執(zhí)行該命令的人不會(huì)干犯蔑視法庭罪，因此，因蔑視法庭而被判監(jiān)禁的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)全屬虛構(gòu)。
爭(zhēng)議2
法庭指出，法庭在考慮是否按公共政策理據(jù)拒絕強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行該裁決時(shí)，不會(huì)考慮案件的是非曲直或案情所建基于的交易。法庭的角色僅限于決定是否存在因違反公共政策而拒絕強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行裁決的理據(jù)。法庭在處理此問題的角色應(yīng)盡可能為機(jī)械式。因此，法庭認(rèn)為在注冊(cè)該裁決的階段，是否無法履行該協(xié)議并非有關(guān)的因素，亦并不是作為在公共政策理據(jù)上拒絕強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行該裁決的充分理由。
爭(zhēng)議3
法庭裁定法庭沒有司法管轄權(quán)把案件發(fā)還仲裁委。根據(jù)《仲裁條例》, 法庭有權(quán)強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行該裁決（或拒絕這樣做），但沒有司法管轄權(quán)發(fā)還案件。
Ⅳ.裁決
上訴被駁回。
?、?典型意義
法庭在考慮是否拒絕強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行該裁決時(shí)，不會(huì)考慮案件的是非曲直或有關(guān)案情的交易。法庭的角色僅限于就拒絕強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行該裁決的理據(jù)是否存在著問題作出判斷。在此基礎(chǔ)上，法庭裁定無法履行協(xié)議在強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行仲裁裁決的注冊(cè)或認(rèn)可階段并非有關(guān)的考慮因素。因此，它并不構(gòu)成基于違反公共政策的理據(jù)而拒絕強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行仲裁裁決的充分理由。
四、山東紅日阿康化工股份有限公司訴中國(guó)石油國(guó)際事業(yè)（香港）有限公司案
[2011] 4 HKLRD 604
CACV 31/2011
?、?基本案情
作為買方的上訴人跟作為供應(yīng)商的答辯人訂立了合同，以獲得3,937.448噸硫的供應(yīng)，并以購買價(jià)3,051,522.20美元為交換條件。上訴人拒絕接收3,810,578噸硫，原因是所提供的硫的規(guī)格不正確。 因此，上訴人要求就該批硫退還一共為2,953,198美元購買價(jià)余額。
雙方就爭(zhēng)議進(jìn)行了由內(nèi)地某仲裁委在內(nèi)地的一個(gè)仲裁庭審理的仲裁。仲裁庭作出了對(duì)上訴人有利的裁決，當(dāng)中裁定：
?。╝）上訴人須向答辯人退還3,810.578噸的硫；
（b）答辯人須向上訴人退還2,953,198美元（即就交易已收取的支付款項(xiàng)）；
?。╟）答辯人須向上訴人支付賠償，雜項(xiàng)費(fèi)用及上訴人的成本支出，加上利息（如有逾期支付情況）；
?。╠）答辯人對(duì)裁決的詮釋則是，根據(jù)上述第(b)及(c)項(xiàng)，退還已收取之交易支付款項(xiàng)余額和支付其他款項(xiàng)的先決條件是，上訴人必須先退還拒絕接收的硫，且退還的硫的品質(zhì)須要相等于供應(yīng)予上訴人時(shí)的“狀況和質(zhì)量”。
為回應(yīng)答辯人的書面申請(qǐng)和詢問，仲裁委發(fā)出了3封信函（“仲裁委信函”）。前兩封信函由仲裁委確認(rèn)答辯人對(duì)裁決的詮釋。第3封信函陳述了仲裁庭認(rèn)為前述的兩封信函是對(duì)裁決的“補(bǔ)充說明”，并構(gòu)成該裁決的一部分觀點(diǎn)。
答辯人發(fā)出的有關(guān)要求澄清以至頒發(fā)補(bǔ)充仲裁裁決的信函，以及仲裁委信函中的兩封所載的回復(fù)都沒有被抄送給上訴人。上訴人不同意答辯人對(duì)裁決的詮釋, 并申請(qǐng)了許可在香港強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行裁決第(b)及(c)項(xiàng)。答辯人反對(duì)其申請(qǐng)，并申請(qǐng)了許可強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行裁決的第（a）項(xiàng)。法庭裁定答辯人勝訴。 隨后，上訴人向上訴庭提出上訴。
?、?爭(zhēng)議
1.鑒于香港法例第341章《仲裁條例》（已廢除）（“《仲裁條例》”）第2GG（1）條，法庭應(yīng)否“按仲裁裁決、命令或指示的條款而作出法庭判決”。（“爭(zhēng)議1”）
2.鑒于仲裁裁決的措辭和強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行法庭的義務(wù)，上述仲裁裁決第(b)及(c)項(xiàng)所提及的義務(wù)是否取決于上述仲裁裁決的第(a)項(xiàng)？（“爭(zhēng)議2”）
3.基于歸還原則適用的情況，上述仲裁裁決第(a)項(xiàng)下的義務(wù)是否獨(dú)立于其第(b)項(xiàng)下的義務(wù)？（“爭(zhēng)議3”）
4.根據(jù)《中華人民共和國(guó)仲裁法》（“仲裁法”）第56條及/或內(nèi)地某仲裁委員會(huì)仲裁規(guī)則有關(guān)條款，仲裁委信函是否構(gòu)成補(bǔ)充或附加仲裁裁決，即構(gòu)成裁決的一部分？（“爭(zhēng)議4”）
5.有關(guān)仲裁委信函的有效性應(yīng)否由內(nèi)地有關(guān)法院，而不是香港的強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行法庭處理？（“爭(zhēng)議5”）
Ⅲ.分析
爭(zhēng)議1
法庭援引了權(quán)威判決，指出仲裁裁決的強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行應(yīng)“幾乎是行政程序的事宜”；而基于重要的政策因素，法庭需要確保仲裁裁決能被有效且迅速地強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行。法庭認(rèn)為，法庭應(yīng)該尊重仲裁裁決背后的清晰意圖, 而無權(quán)摸索裁決背后的理由或猜測(cè)其意圖。根據(jù)《仲裁條例》第2GG（1）條，法庭應(yīng)在裁決的認(rèn)受階段“按仲裁裁決的條款”登錄法庭判決。
爭(zhēng)議2
法庭認(rèn)為，撇開仲裁委信函的事宜，該仲裁裁決明顯地沒有指出上述裁決第(b)及(c)項(xiàng)下的付款義務(wù)取決于第(a)項(xiàng)。因此，在根據(jù)仲裁裁決作出的法庭判決以強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行第(b) 至 (c)項(xiàng)的情況下，不應(yīng)施加條件。否則，仲裁裁決將會(huì)被改變而不是被強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行。按這道理，法庭沒有理由對(duì)硫的狀態(tài)和質(zhì)量施加進(jìn)一步的條件。
爭(zhēng)議3
基于3個(gè)原因，法庭拒絕接納答辯人有關(guān)上述仲裁裁決第(a)和第(b)項(xiàng)下的義務(wù)因?yàn)闅w還原則適用的情況而不會(huì)彼此獨(dú)立的論點(diǎn)：首先，法庭不應(yīng)猜測(cè)裁決背后的意圖；此外，歸還原則在不同的司法管轄區(qū)有所不同，有關(guān)的法律應(yīng)該由仲裁庭應(yīng)用；其次，即使假設(shè)仲裁裁決有關(guān)退還已付款項(xiàng)和退還貨品的義務(wù)并不是彼此獨(dú)立，法庭亦不能因此而斷定有關(guān)的裁決必須取決于彼此。歸還法下的權(quán)利和義務(wù)，不可以與為了對(duì)這些權(quán)利和義務(wù)給予實(shí)效所作的裁決和命令相混淆。
爭(zhēng)議4
根據(jù)仲裁法第56條及/或 內(nèi)地某仲裁委仲裁規(guī)則相關(guān)條款，仲裁委信函并不構(gòu)成補(bǔ)充或附加裁決。因此，在香港的強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行程序中，仲裁庭或仲裁委信函所表達(dá)的觀點(diǎn)不可被接納。
爭(zhēng)議5
基于3個(gè)理由，法庭拒絕接納答辯人有關(guān)應(yīng)該由內(nèi)地有關(guān)法院，而不是香港的強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行法庭來處理仲裁委信函作為補(bǔ)充或附加裁決的有效性的論點(diǎn)：首先，如果法庭發(fā)現(xiàn)在所謂的仲裁裁決或補(bǔ)充裁決與相關(guān)法律或規(guī)則下的仲裁裁決或補(bǔ)充裁決之間的要求存在明顯差異，強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行法庭無須接受被描述為仲裁裁決或補(bǔ)充裁決的所有文件；此外，強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行法庭有權(quán)考慮其有關(guān)強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行外國(guó)或內(nèi)地仲裁裁決的公共政策。在本案里，仲裁委信函其中的第2和第3封的事宜涉及到公共政策中的自然公義規(guī)則。
Ⅳ.裁決
上訴得直。
Ⅴ.典型意義
強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行仲裁裁決應(yīng)“幾乎是機(jī)械式的程序”。強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行法庭無權(quán)亦無須摸索有關(guān)仲裁裁決背后的理由或猜測(cè)其意圖。作為強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行法庭，香港法庭有權(quán)判斷一份文件是否仲裁裁決或補(bǔ)充仲裁裁決，或其中的一部分。法庭亦有權(quán)按其有關(guān)強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行外國(guó)或內(nèi)地仲裁裁決的公共政策決定是否拒絕強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行仲裁裁決。自然公義規(guī)則是否被恪守的問題（此乃本案的仲裁委信函涉及到的事宜）會(huì)被法庭納入其考慮當(dāng)中。
五、郭順開訴永成化工有限公司案
[2013] 3 HKLRD 484
HCCT 35/2012
?、? 基本案情
根據(jù)申請(qǐng)人與答辯人在內(nèi)地某仲裁委員會(huì)管理的仲裁，仲裁庭作出了裁決，裁定答辯人敗訴（“該裁決”）。該裁決要求答辯人向申請(qǐng)人支付：（1）人民幣29,195,470.58元的經(jīng)濟(jì)損失賠償及相關(guān)利息人民幣12,293,716.33元； （2）人民幣500,000元的法律費(fèi)用；及 （3）人民幣675,473元的仲裁程序費(fèi)用，以及人民幣134,574元的仲裁員費(fèi)用。
隨后，申請(qǐng)人獲得法庭發(fā)出的命令及許可，容許該裁決在香港予以強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行（“該命令”）。
答辯人以該裁決超出了交付仲裁的范圍，及仲裁程序與法律相抵觸為理由，向內(nèi)地某人民法院申請(qǐng)了擱置或撤銷該裁決。香港法庭認(rèn)為此申請(qǐng)的性質(zhì)并非以案件所建基的爭(zhēng)議的是非曲直為由提出上訴。
隨后，答辯人根據(jù)香港法例第4A章《高等法院規(guī)則》第73號(hào)命令第10（6）條規(guī)則（“高院規(guī)則”）的規(guī)定，發(fā)出傳票（“該傳票”）以擱置或更改該命令。這正是本案中法庭要解決的問題。
?、?爭(zhēng)議
1.有關(guān)強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行內(nèi)地仲裁裁決的案件，法庭是否有司法管轄權(quán)押后程序？（“爭(zhēng)議1”）
2.法庭在押后有關(guān)申請(qǐng)擱置或更改該命令的聆訊時(shí)，一方申請(qǐng)保證時(shí)應(yīng)考慮哪些因素？（“爭(zhēng)議2”）
?、?分析
爭(zhēng)議1
法庭指出，即使《仲裁條例》在強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行內(nèi)地仲裁裁決程序的部分并沒有提及有關(guān)押后程序的條文，即等同于押后有關(guān)強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行普通仲裁裁決或公約仲裁裁決程序的條文，并不代表法庭沒有司法管轄權(quán)押后有關(guān)強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行內(nèi)地仲裁裁決程序。法庭認(rèn)為其有一般及固有權(quán)力去管制其程序，包括押后程序；此權(quán)力已隱含在高院規(guī)則第73號(hào)命令第10A條規(guī)則當(dāng)中。
爭(zhēng)議2
法庭引述并參考了英國(guó)法庭在Soleh Boneh International Ltd 訴 Government of the Republic of Uganda [1993] 2 LLR 208一案中所列出的原則。在該案中，英國(guó)法庭決定押后聆訊，同時(shí)要求與訟的有關(guān)方提供相當(dāng)于仲裁裁決金額的保證以待瑞典法庭裁定仲裁裁決是否具約束力。在該案上訴的程序中，法庭考慮了兩項(xiàng)因素 – 經(jīng)法庭簡(jiǎn)短審議，有關(guān)仲裁裁決無效的論點(diǎn)的可取性，以及強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行仲裁裁決的難易程度，以及如果執(zhí)行有延誤，執(zhí)行會(huì)否因?yàn)橘Y產(chǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移或不經(jīng)意的交易而變得困難。有關(guān)仲裁裁決無效的論點(diǎn)越有力，或強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行的困難程度會(huì)因?yàn)閳?zhí)行被延誤而提升的情況越明顯，法庭越有可能會(huì)命令與訟的有關(guān)方提供保證。
根據(jù)上述原則，法庭考慮了一系列與本案有關(guān)的因素，包括答辯人未有提供任何文件以列明它向內(nèi)地某人民法院所提出的有關(guān)擱置或撤銷該裁決的申請(qǐng)的是非曲直，從而支持它有關(guān)該裁決是“明顯無效”的論點(diǎn)；答辯人更改了其注冊(cè)辦事處，答辯人出售了其工業(yè)物業(yè)，答辯人的財(cái)政狀況在變差，而且答辯人公司股份（被形容為過時(shí)資產(chǎn)）被母公司于該裁決被頒下后的短時(shí)間內(nèi)出售；還有，已公布的總資產(chǎn)（約4,504萬港元）及未經(jīng)審計(jì)的凈負(fù)債（約1.435億港元）。
?、? 裁決
基于上述因素，及在沒有有關(guān)特定保證金額會(huì)超出答辯人能力范圍的陳詞的情況下，法庭押后該傳票聆訊以待內(nèi)地某人民法院裁定該裁決應(yīng)否被擱置或撤銷，及命令答辯人提供2,000萬港元作為保證金，以保障該裁決在聆訊被押后的情況下能在香港成功予以強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行的機(jī)會(huì)。
?、? 典型意義
香港特區(qū)高等法院有權(quán)押后有關(guān)強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行內(nèi)地仲裁裁決程序的聆訊并要求答辯人提供保證金。
關(guān)于應(yīng)否命令答辯人提供保證以履行裁決，法院的考慮因素主要有兩點(diǎn)。首先是裁決無效的論點(diǎn)。如果裁決明顯無效，則應(yīng)押后聆訊并不應(yīng)發(fā)出命令要求提供保證；但是，如果該裁決明顯有效，則應(yīng)該立即發(fā)出強(qiáng)制執(zhí)行命令或發(fā)出命令要求提供大量保證。其次，法院應(yīng)考慮執(zhí)行的難易程度以及任何延遲執(zhí)行的影響，例如透過資產(chǎn)的轉(zhuǎn)移或不經(jīng)意的交易。
Cases of the people's courts of Mainland
CASE No.1： Application of Farenco Shipping Pte. Ltd. for Enforcement of Arbitration Awards made in Hong Kong
(2018)Yue 72 Ren Gang No. 1, (2019) Yue 72 Ren Gang No. 1
I. Basic facts
On 1 February 2012, Farenco Shipping Pte. Ltd. (“Farenco”) of Singapore signed a contract of affreightment(“COA”) with Eastern Ocean Transportation Co., Ltd. (“Eastern Ocean”), agreeing that Eastern Ocean would transport the goods of Farenco, and all disputes arising from the COA would be submitted to arbitration in Hong Kong SAR with the application of the law of the United Kingdom (“UK law”). On 21 April of the same year, Farencosent an e-mail to Eastern Ocean to confirm that both parties had entered into a supplementary contract on the basis of the aforementioned COA, agreeing to add an additional lot of cargo to be transported, and that other terms and conditions of the COA would apply. Subsequently, a dispute over the performance of the supplementary contract arose between the parties, followed by its submission to arbitration in Hong Kong SAR by Farencoon 16 February 2016. According to the first final award and the final award on costs it handed down, the arbitral tribunal in Hong Kong SAR ruled that Eastern Ocean was to pay the corresponding damages and related arbitration fees.
After the arbitration awards came into effect, Farencoapplied to the Guangzhou Maritime Court for recognition and enforcement of the two arbitration awards. Eastern Ocean responded that the arbitration agreement submitted by Farenco had not been notarised and certified, nor had an officially certified Chinese translation been submitted. The freight in question was the subject matter of the supplementary contract, which was reached orally by both parties over the phone without having any arbitration clauses agreed on or any arbitration agreement concluded. Besides, Eastern Ocean had never recognised the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. For these reasons, the enforcement of the arbitration awards would contravene the requirements under the Arbitration Law of the Mainland that arbitration agreement must be express and the relevant provisions of the General Rules of the Civil Law on the expression of intention, and would be contrary to the public interests.
II. Rulings
The Guangzhou Maritime Court held that: First, the instruments Farenco submitted in its application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitration awards conform to the requirements on the necessary documents under the Supreme People’s Court’s Arrangement Concerning Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards between the Mainland and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (“the Arrangement”). Second, whether an arbitration agreement is tenable falls within the scope of its validity review and, in view of the lack of an agreement between the two parties on the applicable law for ascertaining the validity of the arbitration agreement, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Arrangement, whether an arbitration agreement in question is tenable should be decided in accordance with the law of the place of arbitration, i.e. the law of Hong Kong SAR. According to the law of Hong Kong SAR, the incorporation terms set out in the subject email constitutes a valid arbitration agreement. Third, violation of relevant provisions of the law of the Mainland is not equivalent to breach of the public interests of the Mainland unless the recognition and enforcement of the arbitration awards will seriously damage the basic principles of the law of the Mainland. The requirements for express arbitration agreement under the Arbitration Law of the Mainland and expression of intention under the General Rules of the Civil Law are outside the ambit of the basic principles of the law of the Mainland. In view of the above reasons, it was held that the two arbitration awards should be recognised and enforced. Besides, in response to Farenco’s application, the Guangzhou Maritime Court had frozen Eastern Ocean’s deposit at the China Merchants Bank (Shenzhen Branch) before handing down a ruling on the case.
III. Significance
First, the case has clarified that whether an arbitration agreement is tenable falls within the scope of validity review. An arbitration agreement is an essential instrument for the application by a party for recognition and enforcement of an arbitration award. It has a direct implication on the jurisdiction of the relevant arbitral tribunal. A review of the validity of an arbitration agreement is obligatory prior to the recognition and enforcement of a relevant arbitration award. In this connection, Article 7(1) of the Arrangement stipulates that the court may refuse to enforce an arbitral award if the arbitration agreement was invalid. In practice, however, there is controversy over whether a broad or strict interpretation should be adopted for invalid arbitration agreements and whether the case of failing to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement should be included. In this case, the court looked beyond the literal meaning for the intent of the provision of the Agreement and ruled that the proof of existence of the arbitration agreement was a prerequisite for it to be valid, which falls within the scope of review of its validity. Agreements that are invalid should cover those cases where their existence cannot be proved.
Secondly, interim measures are granted upon application before an arbitration award is recognised and enforced. The Arrangement is silent on whether the court can, before or after handling an application for recognition and enforcement of an arbitration award, grant interim measures against the property of the party against whom the application is filed. Besides, there is inconsistent interpretations of the Arrangement when it comes to implementation. By reference to the Arrangement Concerning Mutual Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards between the Mainland and the Macao Special Administrative Region, and according to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China and its relevant judicial interpretations, it was held that in the present case upon application by the party concerned, pre-trial interim measures could be granted before the party concerned applied for recognition and enforcement of the arbitration awards and that after such application was filed, the court could, before recognising and enforcing the awards, grant preventive remedies to facilitate the smooth enforcement of the awards for the better protection of the legitimate rights and interests of the party concerned.
CASE No.2： Application for Enforcement of a Hong Kong Arbitration Award by the Applicant Ennead Architects International LLP of the United States
(2016) Su 01 Ren Gang No. 1
I.Basic facts
On 29 March and 15 May 2013, Ennead Architects International LLP (hereinafter referred to as “Ennead”) of the United States and R&F Nanjing Real Estate Development Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “R&F”) signed a land lot design contract and agreed on the arbitration clauses stipulating that any disputes shall be submitted to the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (hereinafter referred to as “CIETAC”) for arbitration in accordance with its prevailing arbitration rules at the time of application for arbitration, and that the place of arbitration shall be the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. In the wake of a dispute over contract performance, Ennead applied to the CIETAC Hong Kong Arbitration Center for arbitration, seeking an arbitration award ordering R&F to, among others, pay the outstanding design fees and bear the liability for breach of contract.
The CIETAC Hong Kong Arbitration Center accepted the case pursuant to the CIETAC Arbitration Rules, which came into effect on 1 January 2015, and made the arbitration award (2015) Zhong Guo Mao Zhong Gang Cai Zi No. 0003 on 28 November 2015.On 7 June 2016, Ennead applied to the Intermediate People’s Court of Nanjing City, Jiangsu Province for enforcement of Item 3 of the arbitration award, i.e. the part on payment of interest. R&F did not raise any objection.
II.Rulings
The Intermediate People's Court of Nanjing City, Jiangsu Province held upon examination that R&F had raised no objection to the arbitration award concerning the present case and had performed the part of the award on the principal amount of design fees as determined, failing only the part on payment of overdue interest under Item 3. The arbitration award in the case also would not be contrary to the public interests of the Mainland. Therefore, pursuant to Articles 1 and 7 of theSupreme People’s Court’s Arrangement Concerning Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards between the Mainland and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (hereinafter referred to as “the Arrangement”), it was held that Item 3 of the arbitration award should be enforced.
III.Significance
This case marks the first time an arbitration award made by a Hong Kong branch of a Mainland arbitration institution in an arbitration seated in Hong Kong SAR has been enforced by a Mainland court. The case clarifies and confirms that the criterion for determining the origin of an arbitration award is the place of arbitration, and accordingly holds that the arbitration award involved in the case is a Hong Kong arbitration award, meeting the applicable conditions of the Arrangement.
Mainland laws impose different examination standards for different types of arbitration awards, and generally use the location of the arbitration institution as the basis for determining the origin of an arbitration award. According to the Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Issues Relating to the Enforcement of Hong Kong Arbitration Awards in the Mainland (hereinafter referred to as “the Notice”), any ad hoc arbitration awards made in Hong Kong SAR or any arbitration awards made by foreign arbitration institutions in Hong Kong SAR should be examined by the people’s court in accordance with the provisions of the Arrangement. In effect, this clarifies that the criterion for determining the origin of an arbitration award should be the place of arbitration rather than the location of the arbitration institution. Nevertheless, the Notice has no express provision on whether an arbitration award made by a Mainland arbitration institution in an arbitration seated in Hong Kong SAR is a Hong Kong arbitration award. The determination in the present case of the origin of an arbitration award made by a Hong Kong branch of a Mainland arbitration institution according to the place of arbitration is in line with both the spirit of the Notice and prevailing international standards.
CASE No.3： Application for Recognition and Enforcement of a Hong Kong Arbitration Award by the Applicants David Dein Consultancy Limited and Bramley Corporation Ltd
(2020) Jing 04 Ren Gang No. 5
I.Basic facts
On 24 August 2018, David Dein Consultancy Limited (hereinafter referred to as “David Dein) and Bramley Corporation Ltd (hereinafter referred to as “Bramley”) each signed with Beijing SinoboGuoan Football Club (hereinafter referred to as “Guoan”) a copy of the same Consultancy Agreement agreeing that any disputes should be submitted to the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (hereinafter referred to as “HKIAC”) for settlement by arbitration, with English law as the applicable law. Accordingly, Guoan submitted a notice of arbitration to the HKIAC on 21 November 2018. Subsequently, David Dein and Bramley filed a counterclaim. On 5 March 2020, the HKIAC made an award (case number: HKIAC/A18211) ruling that Guoan had committed a repudiatory breach of the Consultancy Agreement and should pay the relevant fees and interest to David Dein and Bramley.
After the arbitration award had taken effect, David Dein and Bramley applied to the Beijing Fourth Intermediate People’s Court for recognition and enforcement of the award. The respondent Guoan contended that the People’s Court should rule against recognition and enforcement of the arbitration award. The reasons stated included invalidity of the arbitration agreement involved, composition of the arbitral tribunal being contrary to the agreement between the parties and the law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, arbitral proceedings not being in accordance with the agreement between the parties, violation of social and public interests, and that recognition of the amount awarded should be refused.
II. Rulings
The Beijing Fourth Intermediate People’s Court held upon examination that first, the parties in the present case agreed only on the application of substantive English law as the governing law of the agreement, without stating explicitly the law to be applied in confirming the validity of the foreign-related arbitration agreement. As both the location of the arbitration institution and the seat of arbitration were in Hong Kong SAR, the Arbitration Ordinance of Hong Kong should apply in the conduct of the examination, and the agreement was valid under the relevant provisions. Second, according to the 2018 HKIAC Administered Arbitration Rules in force during the arbitration, the composition of the arbitral tribunal was not in breach of the rules. The fact that the arbitrator and the directors of the two companies held office in the English Football Association did not necessarily mean that the arbitrator had conflict of interest with the two companies. As the parties had knowledge of the public information held by the arbitral tribunal, no disclosure was needed and no procedural impunity was involved. Third, some copies of the arbitration documents produced by the applicant and the amount of expenses in his bill did not serve to prove that the arbitral proceedings were inconsistent with the agreement. Such information was public information of the arbitral proceedings and was not in breach of the confidentiality clause. Fourth, public interests, which concerned the interests of the entire community, should be enjoyed by the general public and were different from the interests of the contract parties. Although part of Guoan’s assets were state-owned, it did not follow that all matters relating to those assets should be deemed as public interests. In light of the above, it was held that the arbitration award HKIAC/AC18211 made by the HKIAC of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region should be recognised and enforced.
III. Significance
1. The present case clarifies that where a party relies on the clause “[t]he composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral proceedings was not in accordance with the agreement between the parties” in Article 7 of the Arrangement to contend that there are procedural issues of disclosure and withdrawal on the part of an arbitrator, the Court should make a reasonable judgment on the basis of both the arbitration rules and life experience in examining whether the issues are sufficient to affect the impartiality and independence of the arbitration. In the present case, the arbitrator’s connection and interaction with others for the purposes of work, daily living, study and other social activities, and his holding of office in the same organisation with the people concerned did not necessarily constitute any conflict of interest affecting the impartiality of the arbitration procedure under the withdrawal rules. Arbitrators may choose not to disclose matters not relating to their independence or the impartiality of the arbitration.
2. Elaborating on the issue of public interests, the present case is of considerable reference value. Public interests, which concern the interests of the entire community, should be enjoyed by the general public and are essential for the development and survival of the society as a whole, thus having a public and social nature and are different from the interests of the contract parties. The arbitration involved in this case dealt with a contractual dispute between civil subjects of equal status. The outcome would only affect the contract parties and have nothing to do with public interests. Although part of the assets of the respondent, Guoan, were state-owned, it did not follow that all matters relating to those assets should be deemed as public interests.
CASE No.4： Applicant Raffles International Limited Application for the Enforcement of a Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre Arbitral Award by Applicant Raffles International Limited
(2016) Jin 01 Ren Gang no.1
I.Basic facts
On 15 January 2007, Raffles International Limited（hereinafter “Raffles”）and Haihang Tianjin Center Development Co., Ltd.（hereinafter “Haihang”）entered into a Licence Agreement on the use of logo “Raffles” and trade mark “Raffles”. On the same day, Raffles Hotel Management (Beijing) Company Limited (a connected company of the Raffles conglomerate) (hereinafter “Raffles -Beijing”and Haihang entered into a Hotel Management Agreement on the collaboration on hotel management and operation. The Licence Agreement provides that any disputes, issues or controversies arising from or in connection with the contract shall be submitted to arbitration before the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (hereinafter"HKIAC") for final resolution pursuant to the arbitration rules valid at the time of making the application for arbitration. The seat of the arbitration is Hong Kong SAR. The Licence Agreement also provides that, if the Hotel Management Agreement or any other transaction agreements are terminated for any reasons, the Licence Agreement shall be terminated immediately. The Hotel Management Agreement stipulates that relevant disputes shall be submitted to arbitration before the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Shanghai Sub-Commission (hereinafter “CIETAC Shanghai”).
On 20 January 2012, Raffles applied to HKIAC for arbitration of the disputes relating to the Licence Agreement. On 29 January 2012, Raffles -Beijing applied to CIETAC Shanghai for arbitration of disputes relating to the Hotel Management Agreement. Thereafter, the HKIAC made an award (Case No.: HKIAC/A12016) ordering that Haihang pay Raffles the corresponding sum with interest. Raffles applied to The First Intermediate People’s Court of Tianjin for enforcement of the award. Haihang, the Respondent, resisted the enforcement on the grounds, inter alia, that the award dealt with a dispute not falling within the ambit of the arbitration clause, in breach of Article 7 of the Supreme People’s Court’s Arrangement Concerning Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Between the Mainland and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (hereinafter “Arrangement”).
II.Rulings
Having reported to the Higher People’s Court of Tianjin and the Supreme People’s Court, The First Intermediate People’s Court of Tianjin held that: first, the fact that HKIAC award involved the Hotel Management Agreement did not constitute decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, and therefore did not fall within the circumstances prescribed by Article 7(1)(3) of the Arrangement; second, the tribunal’s handling of the issue of jurisdiction did not breach parties’ agreement and the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and therefore did not fall within the circumstances prescribed by Article 7(1)(4) of the Arrangement; third, the challenge raised by Haihangwas not in relation to the impartiality or the independence of the arbitrators, but the jurisdiction of the tribunal and, as such the tribunal had the power to decide the issue without the need to resort to the Council of the Arbitration Centre for a determination. Therefore, the subject matter of the challenge raised did not fall within the circumstances prescribed by Article 7(1)(4) of the Arrangement. To sum up, The First Intermediate People’s Court of Tianjin held that the partial award and final award (Case No.:HKIAC/A12016) made by the HKIAC on 19 November 2014 and 19 March 2015 respectively could be enforced in accordance with Article 1, 6 and 7 of the Arrangement.
III.Significance
In respect of whether an award contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of submission to arbitration prescribed by Article 7(1)(3) of the Arrangement, the following rules are clarified: Where the tribunal’s adjudication is confined to the fact-finding and reasoning sections of the award in respect of disputes beyond the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction, and the dispositive section of the award does not concern other agreement-related disputes, the award did not contain matters beyond the scope of submission to arbitration. In the present case, the matters Raffles submitted to arbitration before HKIAC were matters relating to the performance of the Licence Agreement. As the Licence Agreement and the Hotel Management Agreement are closely connected, the award touched on the Hotel Management Agreement in its section on fact-finding and reasoning. This analysis and determination could not be avoided in the course of dealing with a controversy arising from the Licence Agreement. The tribunal eventually merely made the award on issues arising from the Licence Agreement mentioned in the Request for Arbitration without making specific award decisions on issues arising from the Hotel Management Agreement. The relevant disputes fell within the scope of parties’ submission to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause. Therefore, the award in the present case did not give rise to the circumstances prescribed by Article 7(1)(3) of the Arrangement, where matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration were decided by the award.
CASE No.5： Application for enforcement of an arbitral award made by the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre by Bensley Design Group International Consulting Co., Ltd.
(2019) Chuan 01 Ren Gang No. 1
I. Basic facts
On 13 November 2013, Bensley Design Group International Consulting Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Bensley Co.”) signed a Service Agreement on Landscape Design for Mandarin Oriental, Chengdu, China (hereinafter referred to as “Service Agreement”) with Chengdu Mind River Land Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Mind Co.”) and Chengdu Chenchuan Industrial Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Chenchuan Co.”). Under the Service Agreement, any disputes, controversies or claims arising from or related to this contract or the breach, termination or invalidity of this contract shall be, in accordance with the then effective Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (hereinafter referred to as “Arbitration Rules”), resolved by arbitration in Hong Kong SAR. Due to a dispute arising in the course of the performance of the contract, Bensley Co. applied to the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (hereinafter referred to as “HKIAC”) for arbitration on 5 March 2018. On 5 May 2019, the arbitral tribunal made the Final Award, which was in support of all arbitration requests of Bensley Co. On 4 June 2019, the arbitral tribunal issued the Correction of the Final Award, where corrections and updates were made to the Final Award. Subsequently, Bensley Co. applied to the Chengdu Intermediate People’s Court in Sichuan Province for enforcement of the above arbitral award.
In their joint defence, Mind Co. and Chenchuan Co. stated that firstly, the selection of arbitrator by direct appointment of a sole arbitrator contravened Article 8 of the Arbitration Rules which required that the views of all parties shall be sought before using the list-procedure, thus falling within the situation stipulated in Article 7(4) of the Supreme People’s Court’s Arrangement Concerning Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards between the Mainland and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (hereinafter referred to as “the Arrangement”). Secondly, the arbitrator failed to deliver relevant documents relating to the arbitration to the Respondents in accordance with the Measures for the Administration of China Appointed Attesting Officers (Hong Kong) (Order No. 69 of the Ministry of Justice)(hereinafter referred to as “the Measures”), which was a situation stipulated in Article 7(2) of the Arrangement. It has therefore requested that the application be rejected.
II. Rulings
Firstly, regarding the composition of the arbitral tribunal in the present case, the Chengdu Intermediate People’s Court in Sichuan Province held, upon examination, that the HKIAC’s exercise of discretion to appoint a sole arbitrator during the arbitral proceedings in question was in compliance with the Arbitration Rules, to which both parties to the Service Agreement had agreed to adopt. Secondly, regarding whether the arbitral tribunal had delivered notice to the Respondents in an appropriate manner, since in the course of the arbitral proceedings the arbitrator had arranged for delivery of relevant documents to the addresses designated by both parties in the Service Agreement and the Respondents had also expressly acknowledged receipt of the same, it was held that the delivery requirements set out in Article 2 of the Arbitration Rules had been complied with and that there was no question of the arbitrator failing to deliver notice to the Respondents in an appropriate manner. The Respondents’ contention that documents relating to the arbitration should be delivered to the Respondents in accordance with the Measures was held incompatible with the Arbitration Rules and was not accepted.
III. significance
It is established in the present case that the arbitration rules applicable to the arbitral proceedings in question should be the basis on which to determine whether a notice has been successfully delivered. Given that “non-delivery of notice pursuant to the law” is a ground commonly used by respondents for refusing the enforcement of arbitral awards made in Hong Kong SAR, it is necessary to first establish the legal basis of the delivery procedure in order to determine whether a notice has been delivered successfully pursuant to the law. In the present case, both parties agreed in the contract that any disputes, controversies or claims arising from or related to this contract or the breach, termination or invalidity of this contract shall be resolved in accordance with the then effective Arbitration Rules. Due respect has therefore been given to the choice of the parties concerned in this case. Relevant documents have been delivered to the addresses designated by both parties in the Service Agreement pursuant to the relevant requirements of the Arbitration Rules and the Respondents have also expressly acknowledged receipt of the same. There is no question of the arbitrator failing to deliver notice to the Respondents in an appropriate manner. The Respondents’ contention that documents relating to the arbitration should be delivered to the Respondents in accordance with the Measures was held incompatible with the Arbitration Rules.
Cases of the courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
CASE No.1： CL v SCG
[2019] 2 HKLRD 144
HCCT 9/2018
I.Brief Facts
This was a hearing of an application by the Respondent on, as a preliminary issue, whether the enforcement of an arbitral award against the Respondent is time-barred under s. 4(1)(c) of the Limitation Ordinance (Cap. 347) (“Limitation Ordinance”).
The Applicant proceeded with arbitration administered by an arbitral centre in Hong Kong against the Respondent and obtained an award on 17 February 2011 in its favour, ordering the Respondent to forthwith pay the Applicant the sum of USD 2,173,000 with interests and costs of the arbitration.
In March 2011, the Applicant demanded payment from the Respondent of the sums due under the award and subsequently costs of the tribunal, yet to no avail. On 7 July 2011, the Applicant commenced proceedings to enforce the award in the People’s Court on the Mainland, which was rejected by that Court. Later, the Applicant appealed the decision to the Higher People’s Court and made an application for a retrial which, however, was rejected by the Higher People’s Court on 1 March 2016.
On 6 February 2018, the Applicant made an ex parte application and successfully obtained leave and an order to enforce the award under s. 2GG of the Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 341) (repealed) (“Arbitration Ordinance”) in Hong Kong (“Order”). On 6 June 2018, the Respondent applied for an inter partes hearing to set aside the Order on various bases including that the application was time-barred by s. 4(1)(c) of the Limitation Ordinance. On 24 July 2018, the question of limitation was ordered to be tried as a preliminary issue.
II.Issues
1.When did the cause of action to enforce the award in this case begin to accrue? (“Issue 1”)
2.Whether the cause of action, and hence the effects of time limitation under s. 4(1)(c) of the Limitation Ordinance, was suspended from the time when the Applicant applied to the People’s Court in the Mainland for enforcement on 7 July 2011 to 1 March 2016, when its application was rejected by the Higher People’s Court, in view of Article 2 of the Arrangement Concerning Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards between the Mainland and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (“Arrangement”)? (“Issue 2”)
III.Analysis
Issue 1
The Respondent submitted that the limitation period commenced from 17 May 2011, 3 months from the date of the award, which was argued to be a reasonable time for the Respondent to pay and honour the award, meaning that the limitation period would have expired on 18 May 2017. Alternatively, the Respondent argued that the latest time from which the cause of action would have accrued was 8 July 2011, i.e. when the Applicant applied to the People’s Court in the Mainland for enforcement of the award. This places the expiry of the limitation period on 9 July 2017.
On the other hand, the Applicant contended that the limitation period only commenced on the date on which the Respondent filed its submission in opposition to the Applicant’s application in the People’s Court in the Mainland, i.e. 11 March 2012. The Applicant argued that despite that no payment was made by the Respondent after the payment demands made by the Applicant in March 2011, no inferences can be drawn from the Respondent’s lack of response as to whether it was disputing the award. The Applicant stated that the Respondent only demonstrated its clear and unequivocal intention not to be bound by the award when it filed its submissions in opposition. Thus, the Applicant argued that only on 11 March 2012 did the cause of action for enforcement accrue.
The court did not accept that the cause of action only accrues when a clear and unequivocal intention not to be bound by the award is demonstrated, noting a similar argument was rejected by International Bulk Shipping and Services Ltd v Minerals and Metals Trading Corp of India [1996] 1 All ER 1017. The court explained that accepting the argument means allowing the award debtor to indefinitely defer and postpone the accrual of its creditor’s cause of action and delaying its right to enforce the debt due under the award. Following International Bulk Shipping and Services Ltd v Minerals and Metals Trading Corp of India [1996] 1 All ER 1017 and Agromet Motoimport Ltd v Moulden Engineering Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 762, the court held that the cause of action on the award accrued “from the breach occasioned by the defendants’ failure to honour the award when called upon to do so”. Hence, limitation begins on the date on which the implied promise to perform the award is broken.
The court further noted that the cause of action arose when the Respondent failed to make payment within a reasonable time of the publication of the award and demand being made. The court noted that what a reasonable time was depended on the terms of the award as well as the facts and circumstances of the case. In the present case, since the Respondent was ordered under the award to pay the Applicant “forthwith”, a reasonable time for payment was held to lapse at the latest by 8 April 2011, i.e. 21 days after the Applicant’s demand for payment, and therefore the limitation period expired on 8 April 2017.
Issue 2
The Applicant argued that its accrual of the cause of action was suspended from 7 July 2011 to 1 March 2016, meaning the date on which the Applicant applied to the People’s Court in the Mainland for enforcement to the date when the application was finally rejected by the Higher People’s Court. The Applicant referred to Article 2 of the Arrangement and s. 40C of the Arbitration Ordinance, which prohibits concurrent filing of applications for enforcement of an arbitral award in the Mainland and Hong Kong, and pointed out that the prohibition targets the mischief of double enforcement and double recovery(Shenzhen Kai Loong Investment and Development Co Ltd v CEC Electrical Manufacturing (International) Co. Ltd [2001-2003] HKCLRT 649) and, as such, the Applicant should not be barred from enforcing its award in Hong Kong by operation of s. 4(1)(c) of the Limitation Ordinance simply because it had attempted enforcement in the Mainland.
Nonetheless, the court held that however unfair the consequence of the “no concurrent enforcement rule” may be, absent an express provision in the Arbitration Ordinance or the Arrangement providing otherwise, time under s. 4(1)(c) of the Limitation Ordinance should not stop running, even during the course of the enforcement proceedings in the Mainland. Therefore, the Applicant’s contention that the accrual of cause of action was suspended during the time of enforcement proceedings in the Mainland was rejected.
For reasons set out above, the court held that enforcement of the award was barred by s.4(1)(c) of the Limitation Ordinance when proceedings for leave for enforcement in Hong Kong were instituted on 6 February 2018.
IV.Decisions
Respondent’s application for setting aside the Order granted.
V.Significance
(a)Time limitation begins on the date when the implied promise to perform the award is broken, which is when the award debtor fails to perform the award within a reasonable time of the publication of the award and demand being made. What is a reasonable time for performing the award depends on the terms of the award as well as the facts and circumstances of the case.
(b)This case shows that time under the Limitation Ordinance still runs despite the fact that an award creditor must have failed to recover the total amount due under an award in one place before seeking enforcement in respect of outstanding liabilities in another, as provided for under Article 2 of the Arrangement. The unfair consequences that this may give rise to, such as the hardship the Applicant in the present case faces, highlights the defects in the original Arrangement and the necessity of reform with respect to the prohibition against concurrent enforcement in both places under Article 2 of the Arrangement.
CASE No.2：Gao Haiyan & Anor v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd & Anor
[2012] 1 HKLRD 627
CACV 79/2011
I.Brief Facts
By way of a share transfer agreement and a supplemental share transfer agreement (“the Agreements”), the Applicants transferred the shares in a Hong Kong company to the Respondents, which held beneficial interest in a joint venture coal business in Mainland China. The Agreements were governed by PRC law and provided for arbitration of disputes at an arbitral body in the Mainland.
Pursuant to Article 37 of the Arbitration Rules of the arbitral body, mediation-arbitration is to be conducted either by the tribunal or presiding arbitrator, or provided that the parties agree, by any third party. The tribunal held two sittings. After the first sitting, the tribunal on its own initiative suggested to the parties that the Respondents pay the Applicants RMB 250 million to settle the case.
Before the second sitting, in the absence of the Respondents’ appointee and the Chief Arbitrator, the Applicants’ appointed arbitrator, and a person related to the Respondents upon the invitation of the Secretary General of the arbitral body, attended a purported mediation-arbitration in the form of a private meeting. The Secretary General of the arbitral body who was not appointed by the parties’ was alleged to be the host of the private meeting. It was alleged that the Secretary General of the arbitral body asked the person related to the Respondents to persuade the Respondents into accepting the suggestion put forward by the tribunal.
The parties could not settle. The tribunal found in favour of the Applicants and recommended (yet did not require) a compensation of RMB 50 million. At no point did the Respondents complain about the tribunal’s conduct, fearing that to do so might antagonise the tribunal. The Respondents appealed against the award of the tribunal to the Intermediate People’s Court where the arbitral body situates (“Xi’an Court”) contending that the Secretary General of the arbitral body had manipulated the outcome of the arbitration in contravention of the law and the arbitration rules. The appeal was dismissed.
Subsequently, pursuant to sections 2GG and 40B of the Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 341) (repealed) (“Arbitration Ordinance”), the Applicants obtained leave to enforce the award. The Respondents, in applying to set aside the leave, contended that it would be contrary to public policy to enforce the award because it was tainted by bias or apparent bias. The Respondents argued that the private meeting over dinner among the Applicants’ appointed arbitrator, the Secretary General of the arbitral body and the person related to the Respondents, was an attempt to pressurise the Respondents to pay RMB 250 million to the Applicants in return for a decision in the Respondents’ favour. The first instance judge held that the award was tainted by apparent bias. He further held that the Respondents did not waive their entitlement to complain about bias in proceeding with a second sitting after the private meeting. The Applicants appealed.
II.Issues
1.Whether the public policy ground applicable to the enforcement of a Convention award are applicable to a Mainland award and how high is the relevant threshold? (“Issue 1”)
2.Whether the Respondents waived their rights to complain about the non-compliance with the Arbitration Rules of the arbitral body? (“Issue 2”)
3.Whether apparent bias (as opposed to actual bias) may be sufficient to constitute the public policy ground for refusing enforcement of the award? (“Issue 3”)
4.Whether, on facts, the alleged apparent bias constituted the public policy ground for refusing enforcement of the award? (“Issue 4”)
III.Analysis
Issue 1
It was held that the jurisprudence on refusal to enforce an award on the public policy ground applicable to a Convention award is also applicable to a Mainland award. The relevant threshold is a very high one, since comity, which was held to be “woven” into the concept of public policy, has to be given effect where a foreign (including a Mainland) award is concerned. On this point, the court cited Hebei Import & Export Corp v Polytek Engineering Co Ltd (1999) 2 HKCFAR 111, in which the court remarked that, to give effect to comity, enforcement of foreign awards would not be refused unless such enforcement would be contrary to the fundamental concepts of morality and justice of Hong Kong, of which conclusion would take a very strong case to reach.
Issue 2
The court held that a party to an arbitration relying on breach of arbitration rules should do so promptly; it should not wait and see how its claims turn out before pursuing his complaint; nor should it proceed with the arbitration as if there had been compliance. As such, the Respondents should not have only submitted to the tribunal a supplemental submission after the private meeting, or attended a second hearing before the tribunal without making a complaint. The court also held that the attack by the Respondents against the Applicants’ integrity was not a substitute for a complaint about bias of any sort or impropriety against the tribunal or the Secretary General of the arbitral body. For these reasons, the Respondents are deemed to have waived their rights to complain about bias.
The court pointed out that, had the complaint been raised, action might have been taken by the tribunal or the People’s Court where the arbitral body situates to remedy the situation, both of which would have been in a much better position to ascertain facts to decide on the issue of bias. The court ruled that although the refusal by the People’s Court where the arbitral body situates to set aside the award for bias was not binding on Hong Kong court, and despite no estoppel resulted from the aforementioned Court’s decision, Hong Kong court was entitled to give serious consideration to the aforementioned Court’s decision in deciding whether to enforce the award.
Issue 3
On a careful interpretation of the views expressed in Hebei Import & Export Corp v Polytek Engineering Co Ltd, the court was of the view that apparent bias alone may be sufficient to justify refusal to enforce an award, though a party seeking to resist enforcement on this ground has to reach a higher threshold than the one for doing so on actual bias, and the court should be slow to exercise such discretion.
Issue 4
The court assessed the relevant facts and found that there was no apprehension of apparent bias based on the “fair-minded observer”. The court held that although one might share the learned Judge’s unease about the way in which the mediation was conducted because mediation is normally conducted differently in Hong Kong, whether that would give rise to an apprehension of apparent bias, may depend also on an understanding of how mediation is normally conducted in the place where it was conducted. In this context, due weight must be given to the decision of the People’s Court where the arbitral body situates refusing to set aside the award.
The court reiterated that enforcement of an award should only be refused if to enforce it would be contrary to the fundamental conceptions of morality and justice of the forum, which is Hong Kong in the present case. Accordingly, the court should not refuse to enforce an award in Hong Kong solely because mediation-arbitration in the form of a private meeting might give rise to an appearance of apparent bias in Hong Kong.
IV.Decision
Appeal allowed.
V.Significance
The court held that a party to an arbitration relying on breach of the arbitration rules should do so promptly; it should not wait and see how its claims turns out before pursuing his complaint, or proceed with the arbitration as if there had been compliance.
Enforcement of an award would only be refused if enforcement would be “contrary to the fundamental conceptions of morality and justice” of the forum. The court respects the usual way of conducting mediation in the forum where the mediation takes place and would not invoke the public policy grounds lightly solely because it is conducted differently from the way it is conducted locally.
CASE No.3： Xiamen Xinjingdi Group Ltd v. Eton Properties Ltd & another
[2009] 4 HKLRD 353;
CACV 106/2008 & CACV 197/2008
I.Brief Facts
The 1st and 2nd Appellants, two Hong Kong companies, were the sole shareholders of Legend Properties (Hong Kong) Co Ltd (“Hong Kong Legend”), and part of the Eton Group. Hong Kong Legend wholly owned a Mainland company which owned land in Xiamen (the “Property”).
The Applicant, a Mainland company, agreed to pay RMB 120 million to the Appellants for the right to develop, operate and to receive profits from the Property; and the Appellants agreed to transfer to the Applicant their shares in Hong Kong Legend and to deliver the Property to the Applicant (the “Agreement”). The Agreement also contained an arbitration clause.
The Appellants did not deliver the Property to the Applicant and purported to terminate the Agreement on the basis that performance would be contrary to PRC law. Consequently, the Applicant commenced arbitration proceedings in Beijing (the “First Arbitration”) and an award (the “Award”) was made in its favour ordering the Appellants to, inter alia, “continue to perform the agreement”. The Applicant then obtained an ex parte enforcement order of the Award in Hong Kong (the “Order”).
The Appellants applied to set aside the Order, arguing that enforcement should be refused as being contrary to public policy under the Arbitration Ordinance (Cap.341) (“Arbitration Ordinance”) on the basis that performance was impossible because: (a) construction on the Property had commenced; and (b) a restructuring of the Eton Group, which was implemented during the course of the First Arbitration, had diluted and transferred their shares in Hong Kong Legend to their parent company. The judge refused to set aside the Order.
In the meantime, the Appellants sought from the arbitral body a determination (the “Second Arbitration”) on whether the parties had been discharged from the Agreement. The arbitral body ruled against the Appellants on this.
By the time of the present hearing to deal with the Appellants’ appeal against the judge’s refusal to set aside the Order, the development of the Property had been completed and 99% of the units had been sold to third parties. The Appellants submitted that as performance was impossible, the Applicant was really looking at “further stages” remedies such as damages in lieu of or an account of profits rather than any rights in the Property itself; and offered an undertaking that they would commence further arbitration before the arbitral body for a determination of such alternative remedies (the “Undertaking”). Alternatively, it was said that the court could remit the matter to the arbitral body so that directions could be obtained or adjourn the appeal pending such directions.
II.Issues
1.Whether it was impossible for the Appellants to perform the Agreement? (“Issue 1”)
2.Whether, in light of issue 1, refusal to enforce the Award on public policy grounds can be justified? (“Issue 2”)
3.Whether the court had jurisdiction to remit the matter to the arbitral body? (“Issue 3”)
III.Analysis
Issue 1
The court reckoned the Undertaking was simply meaningless, given that the Appellants had had ample opportunity to raise squarely before the arbitral body the issue of impossibility of performance. The court was of the view that there was no rational explanation for their failure to do so except the very obvious one that the omission was intentional. The court rejected the Appellants’ arguments that the construction on the Property having been commenced; that the dilution of shares as a result of the restructuring of the Eton Group and that most units of the Property having been transferred to third parties barred the Appellants from performing the Agreement. The court further found that they were calculated risks and self-inflicted, of which consequences the Appellants must bear. The court also remarked that the risk of imprisonment for contempt, which the Appellants raised, was entirely fanciful, since the Order did not specify any time for performance and a person who genuinely is unable to carry out the Order cannot be made liable for the contempt.
Issue 2
The court held that, in considering whether or not to refuse the enforcement of the Award on public policy grounds, the court does not look into the merits or at the underlying transaction. Its role is confined to determining whether such grounds existed for refusing to enforce the award because it would be contrary to public policy. The court’s role should be as mechanistic as possible. Accordingly, the court ruled that impossibility of performance was not relevant at the registration stage of the Award and was not a sufficient reason to justify a refusal of enforcement under public policy grounds.
Issue 3
It was held that the court could not remit the matter to the arbitral body. Under Arbitration Ordinance, the court may enforce the Award or refuse to enforce it but there is no jurisdiction to remit.
IV.Decision
Appeal dismissed.
V.Significance
In considering whether to refuse the enforcement of the Award, the court does not look into the merits or at the underlying transaction. The court’s role is confined to determining whether grounds for refusal of enforcement existed. On this basis, it was held that impossibility of performance is not a relevant factor at the registration/recognition stage of enforcement and, accordingly, it would not be a sufficient reason to justify refusal of enforcement on the grounds that enforcement would be contrary to public policy.
CASE No.4： Shandong Hongri Acron Chemical Joint Stock Company Limited v. PetroChina International (Hong Kong) Corporation Limited
[2011] 4 HKLRD 604
CACV 31/2011
I.Brief Facts
The Appellant as the buyer and the Respondent as the supplier contracted for the supply of a total of 3,937.448 tonnes of sulphur in exchange for purchase price of US$ 3,051,522.20.
The Appellant rejected 3,810,578 tonnes of the sulphur for incorrect specification of the same supplied. It claimed the return of the balance of the purchase price in the sum of US$ 2,953,198 in respect of the rejected sulphur.
Parties submitted their dispute before a tribunal of an arbitral body in the Mainland. The tribunal made a final award in favour of the Appellant, ordering that:
(a)The Appellant shall return 3,810.578 tonnes of sulphur to the Respondent;
(b)The Respondent shall return US$ 2,953,198 (being the transaction payment received) to the Appellant;
(c)The Respondent shall pay damages as well as miscellaneous fees and costs incurred by the Applicant, plus interest (for late payment, if applicable);
The Respondent’s position was that repayment of the balance of the purchase price and payment of the other sums under items (b) and (c) above were conditional upon the return of the rejected sulphur to the Respondent “in the same status and quality” as and when the same was delivered to the Appellant.
In response to the Respondent's written application and enquiries, the arbitral body issued three letters (“the Arbitral Body’s Letters”), the first two being the arbitral body’s confirmation of the Respondent’s interpretation of the award, with the third stating the tribunal’s view that the first two were “supplementary explanations” of the award and formed part of it.
Neither the Respondent’s letters requesting clarification with a view to the production of a supplemental award nor the arbitral body's responses contained in the second and third of the Arbitral Body’s Letters were copied to the Appellant. The Appellant disagreed with the Respondent’s interpretation of the award and sought leave to enforce items (b) and (c) of the award in Hong Kong. This was opposed by the Respondent who also applied for leave to enforce item (a) of the award. The judge in the Court of First Instance ruled in favour of the Respondent. Then, the Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.
II.Issues
1.Whether, as a matter of award recognition, the court should “enter judgment in terms of the award, order or direction”, having regard to s. 2GG(1) of the Arbitration Ordinance (Cap.341) (repealed) (“Arbitration Ordinance”)? (“Issue 1”)
2.Whether the obligations stated in items (b) and (c) above be conditional or dependent on item (a), in light of the wording of the award and the obligation of the enforcing court? (“Issue 2”)
3.Whether the obligations under item (a) were independent of those under item (b) under the law of restitution? (“Issue 3”)
4.Whether the Arbitral Body’s Letters constituted a supplemental or additional award pursuant to Article 56 of the Arbitration Law of the PRC (“Arbitration Law”) and / or the relevant provision of the Arbitration Rules of the arbitral body in the Mainland? (“Issue 4”)
5.Whether the questions about the validity of the Arbitral Body’s Letters should have been dealt with by the relevant court in the Mainland, not the enforcement court in Hong Kong? (“Issue 5”)
III.Analysis
Issue 1
Citing authorities holding that award enforcement should be “almost as a matter of administrative procedure” and that there is an important policy interest in ensuring the effective and speedy enforcement of arbitration award, the court held that it should respect the plain intent of the award in question and the court is not entitled to go behind the award by exploring the reasoning of the tribunal or second-guessing its intention. Therefore, under s.2GG(1) Arbitration Ordinance, an award entered as a judgment had to be entered “in terms of the award” at the award recognition stage.
Issue 2
The court was of the view that, the Arbitral Body’s Letters aside, it was plain that the award did not say that payment obligations under items (b) and (c) were conditional or dependent on those under item (a). Thus, in the context of enforcing items (b) and (c) by means of entering a judgment “in terms of the award”, no such condition should be imposed. To do otherwise would be to alter, rather than to enforce, the award. By the same token, there was no justification for imposing the further condition as to the status and quality of the sulphur.
Issue 3
The court rejected the Respondent’s submissions that the obligations under items (a) and (b) were not independent ones since they dealt with a restitution situation for these reasons: first, the court should not second-guess the intention of the tribunal; second, the law of restitution may vary from one jurisdiction to another, and it is for the tribunal seized of the arbitration to apply the applicable law; third, even if one were to assume that return of the goods and repayment of the price already paid are not mutually independent of each other, it did not follow that the respective awards must be conditional on each other. The rights and obligations under the law of restitution must not be confused with awards and orders as means to give effect to those substantive rights and obligations.
Issue 4
The Arbitral Body’s Letters did not constitute a supplemental or additional award pursuant to Article 56 of the Arbitration Law and / or the relevant provision of the Arbitration Rules of the arbitral body in the Mainland. Thus, the views expressed by the tribunal or in the Arbitral Body’s Letters were simply inadmissible in the enforcement proceedings in Hong Kong.
Issue 5
The court rejected the Respondent’s submissions that all questions about the validity of the Arbitral Body’s Letters as supplemental awards should have been dealt with by the relevant court in the Mainland, not the enforcement court in Hong Kong for these reasons: first, the enforcement court did not have to accept every piece of paper placed before it that was said to be an award or supplemental award as such, despite glaring discrepancies between the description of what amounted to an award or supplemental award in the relevant law or rules and what the court found on the face of the so-called award or supplemental award; second, the enforcement court is entitled to look at its own public policy relating to enforcement of foreign or Mainland awards. In the present case, public policy in terms of the rules of natural justice were at issue so far as the second and third of the Arbitral Body’s Letters were concerned.
IV.Decision
Appeal allowed.
V.Significance
Enforcement of arbitral awards should be "as mechanistic as possible". The enforcing court is neither entitled nor bound to go behind the award in question, explore the reasoning of the arbitral tribunal or second-guess its intention. Hong Kong court as the enforcement court is entitled to determine whether a document constituted an award or a supplemental award, or a part thereof. The court is also entitled to decide whether or not to refuse enforcement of an award on the basis of its own public policy relating to enforcement of foreign or Mainland awards. Observance of the rules of natural justice, which the Arbitral Body’s Letters in the present case concerned, is to be taken into account by the court.
CASE No.5：Guo Shun Kai v. Wing Shing Chemical Co Ltd
[2013] 3 HKLRD 484
HCCT 35/2012
I.Brief Facts
Pursuant to an arbitration between the Applicant and the Respondent administered by an arbitral body in the Mainland, an award was made against the Respondent (the “Award”). The Award required the Respondent to pay the Applicant: (1) compensation for economic loss in the amount of RMB 29,195,470.58 and interest thereon in the amount of RMB 12,293,716.33; (2) legal costs in the amount of RMB 500,000; and (3) costs of the arbitration proceedings in the amount of RMB 675,473 and costs of the arbitrators in the amount of RMB 134,574.
Thereafter, the Applicant obtained an order granting leave to enforce the Award in Hong Kong (the “Order”).
The Respondent applied to the People’s Court in the Mainland to set aside or dismiss the Award on the grounds that the Award exceeded the scope of the arbitration and the procedures of the arbitration were contrary to law. The Hong Kong court was of the view that the application was not an appeal on the merits of the underlying dispute.
Subsequently, the Respondent took out a summons (the “Summons”) to set aside or vary the Order granting leave pursuant to Order 73 rule 10(6) of the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A) (“RHC”), which was the matter before the court in the present case.
II.Issues
1.Whether the court has jurisdiction to adjourn proceedings relating to the enforcement of a Mainland award? (“Issue 1”)
2.What factors should a court take into account in considering the application for security upon adjournment of the Summons dealing with an application to set aside or vary the Order? (“Issue 2”)
III.Analysis
Issue 1
In respect of the adjournment of proceedings, the court pointed out that the absence of provisions specifically on adjournment in relation to the enforcement of a Mainland award, of which equivalent provisions in relation to the enforcement of an ordinary award or a convention award are present in the Arbitration Ordinance, does not mean the court has no jurisdiction to adjourn enforcement proceedings on a Mainland award. The court held that it had general and inherent power to regulate its own proceedings including adjournment, which power is presupposed in Order 73 rule 10A of the RHC
Issue 2
The court referred to principles set out in Soleh Boneh International Ltd v Government of the Republic of Uganda [1993] 2 LLR 208, where the English court decided to adjourn hearings and require the provision of security in the entire amount of the award pending the Swedish court’s determination of whether the award was binding. On appeal of that case, the court considered two factors – the strength of the argument that the award is invalid, on a brief consideration by the court, as well as the ease or difficulty of enforcement of the award and whether enforcement would be made more difficult by movement of assets or by improvident trading if enforcement was delayed. The stronger the argument for invalidity of award, or the stronger the case for difficulty of enforcement as a result of delay in enforcement, the more likely the provision of security is ordered.
In light of the above principles, the court considered a number of aspects of the present case, including the fact the Respondent had not produced any documents stating grounds or merits of its application to the People’s Court in the Mainland to set aside or dismiss the Award in support of its contention that it was “manifestly invalid”; the fact that the Respondent had changed its registered office; the fact that the Respondent had sold its industrial property, the fact that the Respondent’s financial performance was deteriorating and shares in the Respondent company (described as obsolete asset) were sold by its parent company shortly after the Award was made; as well as the publicly announced total assets (approximately HK$45.04 million) and unaudited net liabilities (approximately HK$143.50 million).
IV.Decision
On the basis of the foregoing factors, and the fact that no submission on the specific amount of security that would be beyond the capacity of the Respondent was made, the court ordered adjournment of the Summons pending resolution of the application to the People’s Court in the Mainland to set aside or dismiss the Award, and security in the sum of HK $20 million to be provided to protect against any deterioration of the prospects of successfully enforcing the Award in Hong Kong as a result of the adjournment.
V.Significance
The High Court of the HKSAR has the jurisdiction to adjourn hearings relating to the enforcement of a Mainland award and order provision of security by the Respondent.
As to whether the Respondent should be ordered to provide security to satisfy the award, the court should consider two factors, first, the strength of the argument that the award was invalid. If the award was manifestly invalid, there should be an adjournment and no order for security; but if it was manifestly valid, there should either be an order for immediate enforcement or an order for substantial security. Second, the Court should consider the ease or difficulty of enforcement and the effect of any delay in enforcement, for example by the movement of assets or improvident trading.